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THE FIRST FEDERALISTS 
Wenona T. Singe/* 
ABSTRACT 
One aspect of federalism's values that scholars and the courts have largely 
ignored is their relevance to tribal governance. As sovereigns within the United 
States that govern with a measure of de jure autonomy, Indian tribes are 
important agents of self-rule within the United States' federal system. The tribal 
exercise of sovereignty, while not part of the constitutional design of federalism 
in the United States, is nevertheless an example of the principles of federalism in 
operation. 
However, Indian tribes do not receive any accommodation on account of 
their ability to promote the values of federalism. On the contrary, in dicta that 
often overshadow the judiciary's formalist doctrinal analyses, courts regularly 
portray tribal governance as dangerously foreign, destabilizing, and 
undemocratic. From a federalism standpoint, this criticism is perplexing because 
diversity, pluralism, innovation, and experimentation are core values that our 
judiciary and legal profession expressly endorse. The judiciary's dismissive 
characterization of tribal governance and its segregation of tribes from 
discussions of federalism's values are also striking, given that federalism existed 
within tribal governing structures long before it was adopted within the U.S. 
Constitution. Tribes are the nation's first federalists, and they continue to engage 
in federalism as members of the U.S. federal system. 
By focusing on the intersection of tribal governance, federalism's values, 
and the judiciary's role in determining the proper allocation of federal, state, and 
tribal authority, this Article reveals that federalism is not a neutral norm that is 
equally applied to subnational sovereigns who engage in the act of governance. 
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Despite federalism's theoretical support of diversity, pluralism, innovation, and 
experimentation, in reality, federalism is applied within a bounded and highly 
policed realm. For those sovereigns within federalism's protected space, diversity 
and innovation are theoretically promoted. For those sovereigns who exhibit 
federalism yet who are not part of federalism's constitutional design, governance 
reflecting authentic cultural diversity is confined and limited to an increasingly 
narrow sphere. This Article discusses this dynamic and calls for an engagement 
of federalism's values in judicial review of tribal jurisdictional disputes. This 
recommendation, if followed, will serve the nation and tribal communities by 
empowering rather than thwarting the exercise of effective governance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenarios, all involving the actions of separate 
sovereigns located within the borders of the United States: 
(1) A legislative body responsible for enacting laws and making 
decisions requires direct voting on all matters by all adult 
citizens of the community,1 
(2) An intergovernmental council develops policies for 
watershed management and water-quality protection using the 
knowledge of citizens whose ancestors have inhabited the region 
for thousands of years,2 
(3) A task force designs a novel approach to combatting 
methamphetamine abuse by creating programs that incorporate 
the local population's native language, cultural knowledge, 
practices, and ceremonies,3 
(4) Two governments with competing jurisdictional claims to 
parcels within the same territory jointly adopt a comprehensive 
land use plan that they cooperatively administer,4 and 
(5) An elected leader identifies strategies for streamlining the 
government's regulatory approval process to maximize the 
efficiency of oil and gas development.5 
1. Tribal Government, SAN MANUEL BAND OF SERRANO MISSION INDIANS, 
http://www.sanmanuel-nsn.gov/tribal_works.php.html (last visited June 15, 2014). 
2. Accord, YUKON RIVER INTER-TRIBAL WATERSHED COUNCIL, 
http://www.yritwc.org/About-Us/Accord.aspx (last visited June 15, 2014). 
3. HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., HONORING NATIONS: 
2006 HONOREE NAVAJO NATION METHAMPHETAMINE TASK FORCE 2-3 (2006), 
available at http://nnidatabase.org/db/attachments/text/honoring_nations/2006_HN_ Na 
vajo_methamphetamine_task_force.pdf. 
4. See SWINOMISH LAND USE ADVISORY BD., THE SWINOMISH 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN: THE OFFICIAL LAND USE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 10--11 
(1996), available at http://www.swinomish-nsn.gov/media/5816/swincompplan96.pdf. 
5. Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 112th 
Cong. 3-4 (2013) (statement of Tex Hall, Chairman, Mandan, Hidatsa & Arikara 
Nation) (expressing the need for a streamlined, one-stop-shop for oil and gas 
development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation that would eliminate permitting 
delays and redundancies), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hh 
rg74609/htmUCHRG-112hhrg74609 
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Nearly any observer would agree that these examples constitute 
models of good governance. They demonstrate extensive democratic 
participation by local citizens and responsiveness to local preferences. They 
deploy local knowledge to craft solutions that fit local circumstances. They 
exemplify innovation and experimentation. Furthermore, they highlight the 
potential for enhanced problem solving through intergovernmental 
cooperation and illustrate how competition for economic development can 
lead to attempts to make law and government more economically efficient. 
Scholars who write about our nation's federal system would likely 
assert that these kinds of achievements are representative of federalism's 
benefits. In federal court opinions and scholarship, judges and academics 
regularly tout the benefits of a national political system predicated upon 
separate sovereigns.6 The conventional wisdom maintains that the diffused 
sovereignty of federalism promotes a wide array of desirable outcomes, 
including a check against tyranny by one sovereign against another,7 an 
ability to bring democratic rule closer to the people,8 a greater variety of 
experimentation and innovation,9 and enhanced problem-solving potential 
.htm. 
6. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). Writing for the 
Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated: 
!d. 
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous 
advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive 
to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for 
citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and 
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizemy. 
7. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of 
Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 380 ("Perhaps the most frequently 
mentioned function of the federal system is the one it shares to a large extent with the 
separation of powers, namely, the protection of the citizen against governmental 
oppression-the 'tyranny' that the Framers were so concerned about."). 
8. DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91-92 (1995) ("[O]ne of 
the stronger arguments for a decentralized political structure is that, to the extent the 
electorate is small, and elected representatives are thus more immediately accountable 
to individuals and their concerns, government is brought closer to the people, and 
democratic ideals are more fully realized."). 
9. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a 
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious 
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
2014] The First Federalists 779 
through both intergovernmental cooperation10 and jurisdictional 
redundancy.11 
In addition, the judiciary's desire to protect these desirable outcomes 
exerts substantial influence in cases involving federal-state conflicts. In the 
last 20 years, the Supreme Court has dealt states important victories against 
federal assertions of power and, in many of these cases, the Court has 
justified its reasoning by alleging its fidelity to promoting federalism's 
benefits.12 
Implicit within our nation's commitment to federalism is the belief 
that while its benefits will accrue to individual states, they will also improve 
the welfare of the nation as a whole. When states are free to experiment 
with new policies, such as when Massachusetts implemented health care 
reforms,13 evidence of success at the state level can trigger policy changes at 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."); see also 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he 
States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various 
solutions where the best solution is far from clear."). 
10. See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The 
Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 
1799-1800, 1813 (2008) (arguing that the complex problems of environmental 
regulation require engagement by multiple levels of government). 
11. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, 
Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 661-62 (1981) (describing the 
benefits of redundancy); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical 
Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1045-46 (1977) 
(discussing how redundancy in the federal system helps protect important 
constitutional rights). 
12. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013) ("The 
Voting Rights Act sharply departs from [federalism's] basic principles .... States [must] 
beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they would 
otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own .... "); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) ("The Federal Government may neither issue 
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' 
officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal 
regulatory program. . . . [S]uch commands are fundamentally incompatible with our 
constitutional system of dual sovereignty."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("To uphold the 
Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a 
manner that would ... convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to 
a general police power of the sort retained by the States."). 
13. See generally Phil Hirschkorn & Jeff Glor, Massachusetts' Health Care 
Plan: 6 Years Later, CBS EVENING NEWS (June 25, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/new 
s/massachusetts-health-care-plan-6-years-later/ (describing the Massachusetts health-
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the nationallevel.14 Relatedly, making autonomous policy choices serves a 
communicative function. When the states add their voices to a national 
dialogue, they create new opportunities for intergovernmental negotiation 
and coordination to respond to conflict.15 Federalism's protection of local 
autonomy also reduces the national aggregate harms that can result from 
centralized national policies that impose one-size-fits-all approaches to 
complex, context-driven issues.l6 By avoiding the costs that such blunt 
policies can impose on the nation, and by allowing for local tailoring, 
federalism potentially improves governance for all.17 In addition, 
federalism's empowerment of subnational sovereigns can stimulate broad-
based engagement with issues that span the nation and cross jurisdictional 
boundaries.18 
Granted, the judiciary does not use the functional approach to 
evaluating federal-state conflicts as its primary or exclusive mode of 
analysis. Federalism debates frequently begin as questions of constitutional 
care system first implemented in 2006). 
14. See id. ("The Obama administration cited Massachusetts as a model for 
the 2010 Affordable Care Act .... "); see also Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Andres 
Torres, Universal Health Care in Massachusetts: Setting the Standard for National 
Reform, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 409, 445 (2008). 
15. See Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for 
Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 293 
(2001). 
16. John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense 
of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 89, 106 (2004). 
To the extent that local majorities in different states have divergent 
preferences from each other, a federal system can ensure a higher degree of 
citizen satisfaction than a unitary polity. If, for example, some state-level 
majorities prefer a policy of high taxes and high levels of government services 
while others prefer low taxes and low service levels, they can each be 
accommodated by their respective state governments. A unitary government 
with a one-size-fits-all policy will, by contrast, likely leave a larger proportion 
of the population dissatisfied with the resulting mix of policies. Federalism's 
accommodation of diverse preferences can ease racial, ethnic, religious, and 
ideological conflicts by allowing each of the opposing groups to control policy 
in its own region. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
17. See id. 
18. See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Jurisdiction and Human Rights 
Accountability in Indian Country, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 355, 369-71 (exploring the 
interplay between tribes, the federal government, and international human rights law). 
2014] The First Federalists 781 
interpretation, such as the extent of Congress's enumerated Article I 
powers, and the meaning and force of the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments.19 Yet constitutional law leaves substantial gray areas for 
federal-state conflicts, and federalism's functional arguments frequently 
provide a critical persuasive weight that often tilts the balance in favor of a 
particular outcome.20 
One aspect of federalism's values that scholars and the courts largely 
ignore is their relevance to tribal governance. Each of the scenarios 
described in the opening paragraph documents an actual example of tribal 
exercise of sovereignty. As sovereigns within the United States that govern 
with a measure of de jure autonomy, Indian tribes are important agents of 
self-rule within the United States' federal system. The tribal exercise of 
sovereignty, while not part of the constitutional design of federalism in the 
United States, is nevertheless an example of the principles of federalism in 
operation. 
Indian tribes do not receive any special accommodation because of 
their ability to promote the values of federalism. On the contrary, in dicta 
that often overshadow the judiciary's formalist doctrinal analyses, the 
courts regularly portray tribal governance as dangerously foreign, 
destabilizing, and undemocratic.21 From a federalism standpoint, this 
criticism is perplexing because diversity, pluralism, innovation, and 
experimentation are core values that our judiciary and legal profession 
expressly endorse. The judiciary's dismissive characterization of tribal 
19. For a discussion of the role that statutory interpretation may play in 
interpreting legislation providing for state implementation of federal laws, see Abbe R. 
Gluck, Essay, Instrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 
(2011). 
20. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) ("If the allegations 
here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide ... a remedy for the 
conduct of respondent Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be 
provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States."); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) ("In light of history, practice, precedent, and the 
structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from private suit 
in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by 
Article I legislation."); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,72-73 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
567 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992). 
21. See RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON 
LAW: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE, at XX (2009) (opining that U.S. 
courts "continu[ously] diminish ... sovereignty and deny tribal governments' power"). 
782 Drake Law Review [Vol. 62 
governance and its segregation of tribes from discussions of federalism's 
values are also striking given that federalism existed within tribal governing 
structures long before it was adopted within the U.S. Constitution.22 Tribes 
are the nation's first federalists, and they continue to engage in federalism 
as members of the U.S. federal system. 
By focusing on the intersection of tribal governance, federalism's 
values, and the judiciary's role in determining the proper allocation of 
federal, state, and tribal authority, this Article reveals that federalism is not 
a neutral norm that is equally applied to subnational sovereigns who 
engage in the act of governance. Despite federalism's theoretical support of 
diversity, pluralism, innovation, and experimentation, in reality, federalism 
is applied within a bounded and highly policed realm. For those sovereigns 
within federalism's protected space, diversity and innovation are 
theoretically promoted.23 For those sovereigns who exhibit federalism, but 
are not part of federalism's constitutional design, governance reflecting 
authentic cultural diversity is confined and limited to an increasingly 
narrow sphere. 
This Article unpacks these issues by addressing them in three parts. 
Part I describes the place of tribes within the federal system. It contrasts a 
static account of the constitutional design of federalism with an adaptive 
account that emphasizes the gradual incorporation of tribal governance as 
asymmetric subnational sovereigns in the federal system. Part II argues for 
a meaningful consideration of tribal governance in light of federalism's 
core values. It explores the connection and tension between these values 
and tribal governance, and it claims that they should have a limited place in 
deciding jurisdictional disputes. Part III provides an overview of the 
judiciary's record in deciding tribal jurisdictional disputes. It documents 
how the courts have failed to recognize the federalism benefits of tribal 
governance and how the same qualities that federalism seeks to promote 
have often been denigrated. This Article's conclusion explains that the 
treatment of tribal governance by the judiciary exposes the limits of 
federalism, and it recommends how tribes can harness federalism 
arguments as an additional means of protecting indigenous sovereignty and 
22. See Donald S. Lutz, The Iroquois Confederation Constitution: An 
Analysis, PUBLIUS, Spring 1998, at 99, 103 (describing the self-rule with shared rule 
established by the Iroquois Confederation Constitution, which included a centralized 
Confederation Council). 
23. Ironically, the state government beneficiaries of federalism's 
prescriptions are, on the whole, largely homogenous with similar party politics. 
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survival. 
II. OUR EVOLVING FEDERALISM 
The discussion below offers a descriptive account of federalism in the 
United States. It begins with federalism's constitutional design and then 
explains why federalism in the United States should be viewed as a 
complex adaptive system that has incorporated tribes as asymmetric 
subnational governments. 
A descriptive account of federalism is essential to any discussion of 
the concept because the actual formation, structure, and operation of 
federalism vary throughout the world.24 In contemporary world affairs, 
roughly two-thirds of the world's population lives in a nation structured as 
a federal regime.25 Internationally, federalism encompasses a variety of 
institutional arrangements, some based on the integration of preexisting 
sovereigns and some based on a division of unified sovereignty.26 The 
structure of federalism can also vary from nation to nation, with different 
forms of representation for the constituent units within the national 
government,27 and with symmetric or asymmetric allocations of self-
governance powers among a nation's subnational sovereigns.28 
The diversity of federalism throughout the world helps dispel the 
24. A comparative perspective on federal systems of governance serves as a 
guard against conflating the constitutional design of federalism in the United States 
with a descriptive account of federalism generally. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, 
Protecting Liberty in a Federal System: The US Experience, in PATIERNS OF 
REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK 119 (Jorg Fedtke & Basil S. 
Markesinis eds., 2006) ("Every federalism responds to a unique history, and thus every 
federalism is different from every other."). 
25. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL 
IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 1 (2008). Other scholars claim that as many as 40 
to 80 percent of the world's population lives in federalism regimes. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, 
FEDERAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL, CONFEDERAL AND 
AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS, at XV (2d ed. 1994) (80 percent); RONALD L. WAITS, 
COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS 5 (3d ed. 2008) ( 40 percent). 
26. Nicholas Aroney, Formation, Representation and Amendment in Federal 
Constitutions, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 319 (2006). 
27. Id. at 287. 
28. Examples of asymmetric federal systems include Belgium, India, Russia, 
and Spain. WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, 
MULTICULTURALISM AND CITIZENSHIP 104 (2001); Wilfried Swenden, Asymmetric 
Federalism and Coalition-Making in Belgium, PUBLIUS, Summer 2002, at 67, 67. 
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notion that federalism is a uniquely American concept that exists only in 
the form articulated in the U.S. Constitution. In fact, even within the 
United States, federalism has had different meanings that have been 
unique to each era's political struggles and social changes.29 
Despite the diversity of definitions and interpretations of federalism, 
conceptual clarity requires an attempt to identify a common basis for the 
phenomenon of federal systems of governance. Federalism is often 
described as shared rule with self-rule. In other words, federalism exists 
when there is a structure of government that includes semiautonomous 
states in a system with a common central government and when 
governmental authority is possessed by each level of government.3° 
Globally, federalism embraces a continuum of systems in which the balance 
of power between the centralized state and the regional subnational 
governments may allocate more or less power to the center or the 
periphery. An additional broad definition that encompasses these 
variations is William Riker's statement that "[f]ederalism is a political 
organization in which the activities of government are divided between 
regional governments and a central government in such a way that each 
kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions."31 
While some definitions of federalism emphasize the relationship and 
allocation of power between the levels of government in a federal system,32 
others focus on the relationship between each government and its 
citizens.33 A federal system has been characterized as one in which each 
government has an independent base of authority and the power to make 
its own laws and directly apply those laws to its citizens.34 
29. See, e.g., ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 203 (2010) (comparing the competing interpretations of 
federalism represented by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Judiciary Act of 1801). 
30. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 7 (1987); WILLIAM H. 
RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 5 (1964); WAITS, supra note 
25, at 8; K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 12 (4th ed. 1963). 
31. William H. Riker, Federalism, in GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND 






See ERINRYAN,FEDERALISMANDTHE TuG OF WAR WITHIN 7-8 (2011). 
Id. at 7. 
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A. Federalism's Constitutional Design 
The Constitution's text and structure create a multilevel system of 
governance that explicitly recognizes the exercise of sovereignty by both 
the federal government and the states. Article I vests Congress with 
limited, enumerated powers,35 while the Tenth Amendment provides that 
all powers not delegated to the federal government nor prohibited to the 
states are reserved to the states or the people.36 This system of allocating 
limited, enumerated powers to the federal government and reserving the 
remaining rights to the states leaves significant space for ambiguity 
regarding the limits of Congress's power and the extent to which the states 
have protected domains of exclusive authority. 
The Constitution's Supremacy Clause declares that the Constitution, 
laws of the United States, and treaties entered into by the federal 
government are "the supreme Law of the Land."37 This provision ensures 
that all constitutionally authorized federal laws take precedence over state 
laws, and it mandates that all courts comply with this principle.38 
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution vests the federal courts with 
responsibility for policing the Constitution's federalism by conferring 
federal question and diversity jurisdiction on the judiciary.39 However, the 
Eleventh Amendment imposes a significant limitation on this power by 
affirming that state sovereign immunity shields states against lawsuits 
brought by citizens of other states or nations.40 State sovereign immunity is 
also extended to shield states against suits brought by their own citizens41 
and against suits brought by Indian tribes.42 
Although tribes did not participate in the Constitutional Convention 
and are not parties to the Constitution's federal-state compact,43 the 
35. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
36. /d. amend. X. 
37. /d. art. VI, cl. 2. 
38. /d. 
39. Id. art. III, § 2. 
40. Id. amend. XI. 
41. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). 
42. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991). 
43. !d. ("[I]t would be absurd to suggest that the tribes surrendered immunity 
in a [constitutional] convention to which they were not even parties."); see also Kiowa 
Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) ("[T]ribes were not at the 
Constitutional Convention. They were thus not parties to the 'mutuality of ... 
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Constitution does in fact recognize tribal sovereignty. The Constitution's 
text refers to Indians and Indian tribes in three places: the Commerce 
Clause,44 the original congressional and tax apportionment clause,45 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment's revisions to the apportionment clause.46 Indian 
tribes were also considered in relation to the provisions on Congress's war-
making powers, the Supremacy Clause (to reaffirm existing treaties and 
establish them as the supreme law of the land), and the Treaty Clause.47 
The Commerce Clause reference to Indian tribes, also known as the 
Indian Commerce Clause, authorizes Congress to regulate commerce "with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes."48 Here, the principle of noscitur a sociis applies.49 Just as foreign 
nations and states are recognized as sovereigns, so too are Indian tribes. 
Chief Justice John Marshall considered the meaning of the Indian 
Commerce Clause in determining whether the Cherokee Nation ought to 
be considered the equivalent of a foreign state for purposes of the Supreme 
Court's original jurisdiction.50 His opinion introduced the sui generis term 
"domestic dependent nations" for Indian tribes to distinguish the fact that 
although tribes are a separate and distinct people with the power of self-
governance, they are not equivalent to foreign states because they are 
concession' that 'makes the States' surrender of immunity from suit by sister States 
plausible.'" (quoting Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782)); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 
u.s. 261, 268 (1997). 
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to regulate commerce 
"with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"). 
45. /d. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, 
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, 
and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons." (emphasis added)). 
46. /d. amend. XIV, § 2 ("Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of 
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed."). 
47. Charles F. Wilkinson, Civil Liberties Guarantees When Indian Tribes Act 
as Majority Societies: The Case of the Winnebago Retrocession, 21 CREIGHTON L. REv. 
773, 774-75 (1988). 
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
49. This principle of language interpretation allows a potentially ambiguous 
term to "be given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is 
associated." 73 AM. JuR. 2D Statutes § 125 (2012). Essentially, under the doctrine, "a 
word is known by the company it keeps." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 465 
(1991). 
50. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831). 
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located within the jurisdictional limits of the United States. 51 
The Indian Commerce Clause is also the only constitutional text that 
supplies a normative framework for the relationship between the tribes, the 
federal government, and the states. Although the Clause does not 
specifically address the tribal-state relationship, its adoption reflects the 
Framers' rejection of a parallel provision in the Articles of Confederation 
that did. The earlier version provided that "Congress assembled shall also 
have the sole and exclusive right and power of ... regulating the trade and 
managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, 
provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not 
infringed or violated."52 James Madison later observed that the pairing of 
an "exclusive right and power" in Congress with a right against legislative 
infringement in the states was "obscure and contradictory."53 With little 
debate, the provision was redrafted at the Constitutional Convention to 
eliminate the states' right against legislative infringement.54 In its final 
form, the Indian Commerce Clause explicitly recognizes Congress's 
authority to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, and the Clause's 
silence on states' rights codifies Madison's prescription that the states 
concede a correlating limit on state sovereignty.55 
The original congressional apportionment clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment also contained language excluding "Indians not taxed" from 




!d. at 17. 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 4. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 334 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 
1892). 
54. See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. 
L. REv. 1055, 1155 (1995). 
55. Madison explained that federal power under the Indian Commerce 
Clause required a limitation on state sovereignty: 
[H]ow the trade with Indians, though not members of a state, yet residing 
within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, 
without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely 
incomprehensible. This is not the only case, in which the articles of 
confederation have inconsiderately endeavoured to accomplish impossibilities; 
to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the union, with complete sovereignty in 
the states; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting 
the whole remain. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison), supra note 53, at 334. 
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members of Congress in the House of Representatives.56 These references 
reflect the fact that Indians and Indian tribes were considered outsiders, 
not members of the polity or "the People" that had formed the 
Constitution. Furthermore, the discussion of tribes in the context of the 
War Powers, Supremacy, and Treaty Clauses also reflected the shared 
understanding that Indian tribes occupied a sovereign plane in their 
relations with the United States. 
While the Constitution recognizes tribes as sovereigns, it contains no 
explicit protection of tribal sovereignty .57 In contrast, within constitutional 
federalism, the states receive such protection, and they are explicit holders 
of a variety of other constitutional rights and duties. The Tenth 
Amendment recognizes that the states or the people retain all powers not 
delegated to the federal government or otherwise prohibited to the states.58 
Other state rights and duties are found within Article IV,59 the Supremacy 
Clause,6o and the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments.61 The 
Constitution also provides the states with equal representation in the 
Senate, ensuring that the states will have a voice in the legislative branch,62 
and it provides for state representation in the Electoral College.63 
Indian tribes do not participate in this constitutional allocation of 
rights and responsibilities.64 To be sure, the field of Indian law is dedicated 
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV,§ 2. 
57. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian 
Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 501 (1979) ("It is well established that Congress, in the exercise of 
its plenary power over Indian affairs, may restrict the retained sovereign powers of the 
Indian tribes."). 
58. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
59. /d. art. IV (including the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, and the Guarantee Clause). 
60. !d. art. VI, cl. 2. 
61. !d. amends. X, XIV. 
62. !d. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
63. !d. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
64. Two pro-federalism measures which never materialized for tribes deserve 
mention here. The first is an article in the Treaty of New Echota, which provided the 
Cherokee Nation with a delegate in the House of Representatives. Jack Blair, 
Comment, Demanding a Voice in Our Own Best Interest: A Call for a Delegate of the 
Cherokee Nation to the United States House of Representatives, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV 
225, 229 (1995). This provision was later reaffirmed by the Treaty of 1866 following the 
Civil War, but it has never been enforced. /d. at 230-31, 233. The treaty provided: 
The Cherokee nation having already made great progress in civilization and 
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to articulating a variety of constitutional limits on federal and state 
authority and subconstitutional norms that protect tribal sovereignty and 
autonomy. These norms create the conditions for tribal governance within 
the basic definition of federalism, but they do not formally include tribes 
within federalism's constitutional design. 
B. Federalism's Gradual Integration of Indian Tribes 
Following ratification of the Constitution, the status of Indian tribes 
in the United States evolved through several eras of changing federal 
policies in Indian affairs.65 Throughout these eras, the relationship of tribes 
to the federal system shifted from one of reciprocal treaty diplomacy to one 
of integration through the unilateral, coercive imposition of the federal 
government. 
1. The Treaty Relationship 
The earliest years of the republic are marked by the federal-tribal 
treaty relationship. Prior to colonial independence, many tribes had 
already engaged in nearly two centuries of treaty diplomacy with European 
and colonial governments.66 During this period, and continuing through 
much of the 18th century, "Indian cooperation was the prime requisite for 
European penetration and colonization of the North American 
deeming it important that every proper and laudable inducement should be 
offered to their people to improve their condition as well as to guard and 
secure in the most effectual manner the rights guarantied [sic] to them in this 
treaty, and with a view to illustrate the liberal and enlarged policy of the 
Government of the United States towards the Indians in their removal beyond 
the territorial limits of the States, it is stipulated that they shall be entitled to a 
delegate in the House of Representatives of the United States whenever 
Congress shall make provision for the same. 
Treaty with the Cherokees, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, art. 7, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478, 
482. In addition, the federal government initially supported a plan for statehood for the 
Indian territory in what is now Oklahoma. Tribal support for the plan dissolved, 
however, as federal plans to appoint the territory's governor and require congressional 
approval of all state legislation became clear. See Benjamin A. Kahn, A Place Called 
Home: Native Sovereignty Through Statehood and Political Participation, 53 NAT. 
RESOURCES]. 1,16-18 (2013). 
65. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within 
"Our Federalism": Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 672 
(2006). 
66. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW§ 1.02[1], at 
12-15 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012 ed.). 
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continent."67 George Washington's administration sought to avoid costly 
and potentially devastating Indian wars by maintaining diplomatic 
relationships with tribes based on mutuality and respect.68 
Between 1787 and 1871, the Senate ratified 372 treaties between 
tribes and the federal government.69 The objects of these treaties 
frequently included the maintenance of peace, regulation of trade, and 
agreements to cede lands.7° These treaties are the foundational constitutive 
documents that give shape to the federal-tribal relationship, and they 
reflected the understanding that Indian tribes were separate sovereigns 
with their own distinct polities and territories, capable of engaging in 
nation-to-nation dealings with the United States.71 Justice Marshall would 
later state that 
[t]he constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those 
to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and 
sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and 
consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable 
of making treaties.72 
One of the enduring legacies of the treaties is their embodiment and 
expression of American Indian normative commitments. Until the start of 
the 19th century, Indian treaties constituted a set of mutual, reciprocal 
exchanges founded upon a blending of the diplomatic traditions of Indian 
treaty negotiators with those of European and colonial officials.73 
The treaty relationship caused a significant progression in the gradual 
67. FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE 367 (1984). 
68. See Letter from George Washington, Commander in Chief, Cont'l Army, 
to James Duane, Chairman, Cong. Comm. to Confer with the Commander in Chief 
(Sept. 7, 1783), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 477, 484 (Jared Sparks 
ed., Boston, Russell, Odiorne, and Metcalf 1835). 
69. ARLENE HIRSCHFELDER & MARTHA KREIPE DE MONTANO, THE NATIVE 
AMERICAN ALMANAC: A PORTRAIT OF NATIVE AMERICA TODAY 53 (1993). 
70. !d. at 53-56. 
71. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 
66, § 1.03[1], at 23-26; Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A 
Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 62 
(1999). 
72. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832), abrogation 
recognized by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
73. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN 
INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600-1800, 30-32 (1997). 
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incorporation of Indian tribes into the federal system. Whereas the 
Constitution merely recognized tribes as separate sovereigns and viewed 
them as outsiders to the federal system, the treaties created a web of 
mutual obligations and rights that would later become doctrines governing 
the federal-tribal relationship.74 The common treaty provision in which a 
tribe accepted the federal government's protection, for example, formed 
seeds that would eventually develop into the trust doctrine.75 The 
commitment to protection, coupled with the implicit corollary of 
dependence, was later seized by the judiciary as pragmatic justification for 
its expansive interpretation of congressional plenary power in Indian 
affairs.76 As a result, treaty promises that were formed through arm's 
length negotiations between separate sovereigns later became entrenched 
doctrines that mediated the permanent relationship between the United 
States and Indian tribes. 
The reservations established by treaties also advanced tribal 
incorporation because they identified permanent domestic spaces for tribal 
separatism.77 These reservations, established as part of the reserved rights 
of tribes that had ceded portions of their ancestral territory, replaced the 
indeterminacy of the enforcement of aboriginal title with a limited, but 
explicitly mapped, territory for Indian self-governance.78 
2. The Marshall Trilogy 
State and local greed for Indian resources and open hostility toward 
74. Compare Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831) ("At 
the time the constitution was framed, the idea of appealing to an American court of 
justice for an assertion of right or a redress of wrong, had perhaps never entered the 
mind of an Indian or of his tribe. Their appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the 
government."), with Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 (recognizing that Congress had 
sanctioned and ratified existing treaties, creating mutual rights and duties). 
75. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 ("[Tribes') relation to the 
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government 
for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their 
wants; and address the president as their great father."). 
76. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) ("From their very 
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal 
Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the 
duty of protection, and with it the power."). 
77. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, nME, AND THE LAW: 
NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 14-15 (1987). 
78. See id. 
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Indian rights invigorated the federal government's centralized control over 
managing relations with Indian tribes.79 At the state and local levels, in 
which tribes were gaining treaty-based footholds on their territories, the 
very proposition of Indian rights was utterly rejected.80 As Professor 
Robert Williams has observed, "[h ]istory teaches Indian peoples that in a 
federal system of government, the white racial power organized through 
state governments represents the gravest and most persistent threat to 
Indian rights and cultural survival on this continent. "81 To strengthen the 
federal hand in Indian affairs, President George Washington's 
administration intended to regulate the conduct of frontier settlers and 
land speculators who sought control over Indian resources.82 To this end, 
the first U.S. Congress enacted the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790.83 
This legislation prohibited the purchase of Indian lands without 
congressional approval, and it required a federal license for any person 
conducting trade with the tribes.84 
The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 did not govern disputes that 
arose from earlier transactions, however. In 1823, Chief Justice Marshall's 
opinion in Johnson v. M'Intosh addressed whether a property interest 
stemming from a direct purchase of lands from the Illinois and Piankeshaw 
79. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 66, 
§ 1.03[1 ], at 26 ("The overriding goal ... during the treaty-making period was to obtain 
Indian lands .... "). 
80. Gerard N. Magliocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of 
Worcester v. Georgia and Dred Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 487, 523 (2002) (noting that 
states'-rights advocates "scoffed at the idea that, in addition to federal rights and state 
rights, there should now be 'Indian rights."'). 
81. Robert A. Williams, Jr., "The People of the States Where They Are Found 
Are Often Their Deadliest Enemies": The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights and 
Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 981,987 (1996). 
82. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 66, 
§ 1.03[2], at 34-35. To be sure, the motivation for codifying and exercising federal 
control over Indian trade and land sales was not entirely borne of a benevolent desire 
to protect the Indians. Centralized control over Indian affairs was also a self-serving 
policy that would lock in a federal monopsony in tribal land transactions. 
83. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790). 
84. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 §§ 1, 4. The statute was reenacted 
several times until 1834, when a permanent version was adopted. See Act of June 30, 
1834, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 729, 730 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012) ). The 
prohibition against purchasing Indian lands without federal approval remains codified 
in U.S. law. See 25 U.S.C. § 177. 
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Indians in 1773 and 1775 was valid.85 The original land transactions 
preceded an 1818 purchase by William M'Intosh from the federal 
government,86 which received title to the land by the Treaty of Greenville 
of 1795.87 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion applied the "discovery 
doctrine," resulting in the perpetuation of a fierce legacy of colonial 
domination that dates back to the Crusades.88 Marshall described the 
principle as the following: "[D]iscovery gave title to the government by 
whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other 
European governments, which title might be consummated by 
possession."89 Marshall's opinion held that upon discovery, Indian property 
rights consisted merely of rights of use and occupancy, and the right of 
alienation of this original Indian title was limited so that sales could only be 
made to the discovering nation or its successor.9° Furthermore, the holder 
of rights of the discovering nation had two means of extinguishing original 
Indian title: purchase or conquest.91 
Johnson is just as significant for its underlying false premises as it is 
for its holding on property rights. Marshall characterized the Indians as 
"fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was 
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, 
was to leave the country a wilderness .... "92 Marshall also indicated that 
the "character and habits" of the Indians offered "some excuse" for the 
harshness of the law.93 These words represent the Supreme Court's early 
commitment to using a racist Indian narrative in support of colonial power 
and domination.94 In this early case, Indians were explicitly cast as 
85. Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 571-72 (1823). 
86. /d. at 560. 
87. A Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Wyandot Tribe et a!., art. III, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 
Stat. 49, 49-50. 
88. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The 
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 
1986 WIS. L. REv. 219, 256 ("The underlying medievally-derived ideology-that 
normatively divergent 'savage' peoples could be denied equal rights and status ... had 
become an integral part of the fabric of United States law."). 
89. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573. 
90. /d. at 574. 
91. /d. at 587. 
92. /d. at 590. 
93. /d. at 589. 
94. /d. at 590; see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 590 (1832) 
(asking a rhetorical question about whether tribes "who have made some advances in 
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normatively divergent peoples to justify their exclusion from basic natural, 
human, or constitutional rights. 
The strong nationalist policy in Indian affairs led to intense state and 
local hostilities directed at Native peoples.95 In Georgia, state officials had 
long expected the federal government to extinguish Indian title in the state 
pursuant to an 1802 federal-state compact in which the federal government 
had agreed that it should do so.96 But by 1827, not only had the Cherokee 
Nation resisted removal, it had also adopted a constitution that affirmed 
the tribe's sovereignty and the exercise of its jurisdiction over the tribe's 
treaty-stipulated boundaries.97 In 1828, the Cherokee Nation asserted its 
jurisdiction by challenging the conviction of George Corn Tassel, a 
Cherokee tribal citizen who was convicted in state court and sentenced to 
hang for a murder within the Cherokee territory.98 The U.S. Supreme 
Court accepted the appeal and ordered a stay of Corn Tassel's execution.99 
But before the Cherokees could present their oral arguments in favor of 
tribal jurisdiction, Georgia mooted the case by executing the defendant.l00 
Two days before Georgia executed Corn Tassel, it also passed a series 
of "Cherokee Codes" in an attempt to drive out the Cherokee Nation and 
seize its lands in derogation of its rights.l01 This legislation purported to 
civilization" are "better neighbours than those who are still in a savage state"), 
abrogation recognized by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (6 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831) (implying that court redress was a foreign concept 
to Indians, as they would first resort "to the tomahawk"). 
95. The laws adopted by Georgia described in this section were similar to 
laws adopted by Mississippi affecting the Choctaw and Chickasaw tribes, and laws 
adopted by Alabama affecting the Creeks. 
96. Matthew J. Hegreness, Note, An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: The Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and 
Immunities, 120 YALE L.J. 1820, 1847 (2011). 
97. CONSTITUTION OF THE CHEROKEE NATION of 1827, art. I. 
98. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
28 (1994). 
99. I d. at 29. 
100. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 516 
(1996). Apart from these facts, "(w]e know little about Corn Tassel and his crime." 
HARRING, supra note 98, at 27-28. 
101. The term "Cherokee Codes" was introduced by Professor Magliocca to 
highlight their similarity with the oppressive Black Codes of the Reconstruction era. 
Gerard N. Magliocca, The Cherokee Removal and the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 
DUKE L.J. 875, 885 n.50 (2003). 
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annex Cherokee lands to state counties, extend state civil and criminal laws 
over the Cherokee territory, nullify Cherokee laws, prohibit Cherokee 
citizens from appearing as witnesses in state courts, and provide for the 
surveying and eventual lottery of Cherokee lands.102 Georgia's actions may 
have been among the most egregious, but they formed part of a broad 
pattern of attempts in every state to nullify the rights of Indians and Indian 
tribes under federal law.l03 In an effort to deter sympathizers from living 
within the Cherokee territory, the state also required that all white males 
living within the Cherokee Nation take an oath of loyalty to the 
sovereignty of Georgia and obtain a license.104 
Just three days after Georgia enacted the Cherokee Codes, the 
Cherokee Nation initiated Cherokee Nation v. Georgia by serving a 
subpoena on the State of Georgia for another case challenging Georgia's 
assertion of jurisdiction.105 This case, however, was a lawsuit filed in the 
U.S. Supreme Court by the Cherokee Nation itself against the state of 
Georgia.l06 The claim requested an order restraining Georgia from 
executing and enforcing its laws within the Cherokee territory,107 and it 
sought to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over cases 
between a state and a foreign nation.108 Georgia, convinced that the 
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction, refused to appear for the argument.109 
The Cherokees never obtained judicial review on the merits, however, 
because they failed to get enough votes finding that they were the 
equivalent of a foreign nation.l10 Chief Justice Marshall, writing in support 
of the dismissal but siding with the dissenters on the issue of whether the 
102. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 525-28 (1832), abrogation 
recognized by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
103. See VINE DELORIA JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, THE LEGAL UNIVERSE: 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LAW 133 (2007) ("This practice 
of arresting and harassing Indians under the color of law but dropping the case, or 
shifting the charges to unrelated crimes that avoided the federal question, began with 
the Cherokee but was adopted by nearly all states as a method to nullify federal 
protections guaranteed to Native individuals."). 
104. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 523. 
105. HARRING, supra note 100, at 30. 
106. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831). 
107. !d. 
108. !d. at 15-16; see U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
109. Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and 
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 513 (1969). 
110. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20. 
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tribe possessed sovereignty, described the Cherokee Nation as a "domestic 
dependent nation[]" with the following characteristics: 
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their 
will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of 
possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their 
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian.l11 
Therefore, according to Marshall, Indian tribes possessed sovereignty but 
they inhabited an inferior place as dependent wards within the U.S. 
political system. 
Faced with a dismissal without any review on the merits, the 
Cherokee Nation turned to a new conflict to challenge Georgia's laws. 
Samuel Worcester, a missionary from Vermont living within the Cherokee 
Nation, was arrested by Georgia officials for failing to take the oath of 
loyalty to Georgia sovereignty and failing to obtain a license as required by 
the Cherokee Codes.112 Worcester was criminally convicted of violating the 
license requirement and sentenced to four years of hard labor before he 
appealed to the Supreme Court.l13 With an appeal filed by a white, U.S. 
citizen petitioner, the Cherokee Nation was finally able to receive Supreme 
Court review of its challenge to Georgia's jurisdiction.l14 Presidential 
candidate and former U.S. Attorney General William Wirt, the same 
attorney who had represented the tribe in Cherokee Nation, argued the 
case.115 
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester reviewed the Treaty of 
Hopewell and the Treaty of Holston and found a recognition of tribal 
sovereignty: 
This treaty [of Holston], thus explicitly recogmzmg the national 
character of the Cherokees, and their right of self government; thus 
guarantying their lands; assuming the duty of protection, and of course 
111. /d. at 17. 
112. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 537 (1832), abrogation 
recognized by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
113. !d. at 540. 
114. See Burke, supra note 109, at 519-20. In fact, Worcester and another 
colleague specifically rejected pardons just to get the Cherokees another opportunity in 
Court. ULRICH BONNELL PHILLIPS, GEORGIA AND STATE RIGHTS 80 (1902). 
115. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 534. 
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pledging the faith of the United States for that protection; has been 
frequently renewed, and is now in full force.l16 
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Marshall concluded that the treaties, as well as the Trade and Intercourse 
Act, recognized tribes as "distinct, independent political communities, 
retaining their original natural rights," 117 "in which the laws of Georgia can 
have no force. "118 
The doctrines of the Marshall Trilogy provided a significant push 
toward tribal integration into the U.S. political system. By denying tribes 
full property rights and vesting exclusive rights of purchase in the federal 
government, 119 the discovery doctrine repositioned Indians from outsiders 
engaged in the mutual exchange of treaty commitments to insiders with a 
legal personality defined by the United States. Furthermore, the doctrine 
established a legalized process for the massive dispossession of lands and 
resources on terms that would be most beneficial to the federal 
government.120 The discovery doctrine, then, domesticated Indian lands 
and resources, priming them for transfer to federal hands by eliminating 
the potential for competition from international, state, or other private 
purchasers.121 
Marshall concluded that the domestic character of Indians and Indian 
lands and the exercise of federal authority over Indians did not extinguish 
Indian sovereignty.122 Tribes, therefore, were deemed "domestic dependent 
nations" with powers of self-government.l23 Furthermore, the treaty and 
inherent rights of tribes effectively shielded them from state authority.124 
This final conclusion confirmed that although federal Indian law doctrine 
viewed tribes as domestic, dependent, and divested of full original property 
rights, it also held that tribes remained in possession of their original 
sovereignty and continued to be autonomous agents of self-rule within 
their lands beyond the reach of the states.125 
116. /d. at 556. 
117. /d. at 559. 
118. /d. at 561. 
119. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823). 
120. See id. 
121. See id. at 573-77. 
122. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). 
123. /d.at17. 
124. See id. at 16. 
125. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832), abrogation 
recognized by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
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Within six years of Worcester, the fundamental weakness of the 
opinion's affirmation of tribal sovereignty was cruelly illustrated when the 
Cherokee Nation was forcibly removed to the Indian Territory on the Trail 
of Tears.126 Although Worcester affirmed a measure of autonomy and 
protection from state hostilities, that shield proved ineffective when state 
interests held control over federal policies in Indian affairs.127 The fervently 
states'-rights Jackson administration used the federal power in Indian 
affairs affirmed in the Marshall Trilogy as an opening to proceed with 
Georgia's Indian ethnic cleansing campaign.l28 In 1830, President Jackson 
signed the Indian Removal Act and authorized the negotiation of the 
Treaty of New Echota.129 The treaty incorporated a fraudulently obtained 
consent to removal.l30 In 1838, the War Departmentm finally oversaw the 
Cherokee's forced removal on the Trail of Tears, resulting in the deaths of 
4,000 Cherokee citizens.132 
3. Plenary Power in Indian Affairs 
During the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the 
incorporation of Indian tribes proceeded under the increasingly powerful 
thumb of federal plenary power in Indian affairs. A key moment in this 
transition was the termination of the treaty negotiation process. In 1871, 
Congress adopted legislation declaring that "hereafter no Indian nation or 
tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or 
126. See GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF THE 
FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES OF INDIANS 21, 273-78 (1932). 
127. See id.; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 594 (M'Lean, J., concurring). 
128. See FOREMAN, supra note 126, at 21, 270. 
129. Ethan Davis, An Administrative Trail of Tears: Indian Removal, 50 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 49, 52 (2008); see Indian Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830). 
130. ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN 5 (1940). 
131. At least one scholar has identified the War Department's administration 
of Indian removal during the 1830s as the true birth of the administrative state, long 
before the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. See Davis, supra 
note 129, at 49. Others argue that the administrative state existed throughout the 19th 
century and even in the late 18th century to implement and manage federal control in 
Indian affairs. STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 3-4 (2010). 
132. GARY EVAN MOULTON, JOHN ROSS, CHEROKEE CHIEF 177, 187 (1975). 
But see Russell Thornton, Cherokee Population Losses During the Trail of Tears: A 
New Perspective and a New Estimate, 31 ETHNOHISTORY 289, 298 (1984) (estimating 
that as many as 8,000 Cherokee citizens may have lost their lives due to their forced 
removal). 
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recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the 
United States may contract by treaty."133 The Indian Appropriations Act of 
1871 affirmed that it did not impair existing treaty obligations,134 and its 
constitutionality is doubtful, 135 but it represented an important shift in the 
domestication of Indian tribes and federal Indian law. Going forward, 
tribes no longer participated in diplomatic treaty negotiations and were 
subject to the unilateral decisionmaking of Congress. 
In the 1886 case United States v. Kagama, the Supreme Court 
dramatically expanded its recognition of Congress's authority to legislate in 
Indian affairs.l36 The case involved a challenge to Congress's authority to 
enact the Major Crimes Act, which granted jurisdiction to the federal 
courts over major crimes committed by Indians on reservation lands.137 
Observing that enactment of criminal legislation exceeded the textual 
limitation of the Constitution's Indian Commerce Clause, the Court 
concluded that congressional plenary power in Indian affairs sprang not 
from the Constitution but from the federal government's duty of protection 
owed to Indian tribes.l38 Furthermore, in emphasizing the guardian-ward 
relationship,139 the opinion portrays Indian tribes as weak, helpless, and 
dependent on the United States due to their history of dealings with the 
federal government140 and due to the threat of annihilation presented by 
residents of the states.141 
In the 1903 case Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court 
endorsed the exercise of congressional plenary power when that power was 
unilaterally used to abrogate an Indian treaty by forcibly dividing 
133. Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012)). 
134. /d. 
135. David P. Currie, Indian Treaties, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 445, 451 (2007). 
136. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886). 
137. Indian Major Crimes Act of 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012)); see Kagama, 118 U.S. at 376. 
138. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84 ("These Indian tribes are the wards of the 
nation. They are communities dependent on the United States .... From their very 
weakness and helplessness . . . there arises the duty of protection, and with it the 
power."). 
139. /d. at 383-84. 
140. /d. at 384. 
141. /d. ("They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no 
protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are 
found are often their deadliest enemies."). 
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reservation lands to be held as homesteads by individual tribal members. 142 
The 1867 Medicine Lodge Treaty had ceded Kiowa lands and confined the 
tribe to a reservation for their "absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation."143 The treaty also provided that the United States "solemnly 
agree[ d) that no persons except those herein authorized ... shall ever be 
permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory."144 
Furthermore, the treaty stated that no additional cession of lands would be 
valid "unless executed and signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult 
male Indians" living on the reservation.145 In response to mounting demand 
for Indian lands from frontier settlers, the federal government's Jerome 
Commission fraudulently obtained Kiowa approval to allot their 
reservation to individual tribal members.146 The terms of the allotment 
presented to Congress were different than those discussed with Kiowa 
representatives, and the required three-fourths consent was never 
obtained.147 
In its review of the Kiowas' challenge to the forced allotment, the 
Supreme Court pronounced that "[p ]lenary authority over the tribal 
relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the 
beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not 
subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government."148 
Furthermore, the Court stated that the exercise of that plenary authority 
includes 
[t]he power ... to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though 
presumably such power will be exercised only when circumstances 
arise which will not only justify the government in disregarding the 
stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the 
142. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). 
143. Treaty with the Kiowas and Comanches, U.S.-Kiowa and Comanche 
Tribes of Indians, art. II, Oct. 21, 1867, 15 Stat. 581, 582. 
144. ld. 
145. Id. art. XII, at 585. 
146. Ann Laquer Estin, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: The Long Shadow, in THE 
AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880s, 215, 222-
24 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1980). 
147. See id. at 225-26. 
148. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). The Supreme Court 
later abrogated this portion of the opinion, holding that the exercise of congressional 
plenary power was a nonjusticiable political question. See Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. 
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73,83--84 (1977). 
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country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so.149 
The Court supported its reasoning by citing the unilateral power of 
Congress to abrogate international treaties, but it included no recognition 
of the unique duty of protection and corresponding trust doctrine that 
shaped the federal-tribal colonial relationship,l5° 
The Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of plenary power, its 
decree that the power included the right to abrogate Indian treaties 
unilaterally, and its conclusion that the exercise of plenary power was 
immune from judicial review further consolidated federal control in Indian 
affairs and eviscerated the diplomacy and mutuality of the early treaty 
relationship. By the end of the 19th century, Indian tribes no longer 
possessed an external status in which tribes participated in defining their 
relationship with the United States through treaty negotiations.l51 The 
genesis of plenary power in Indian affairs entrenched tribes within a space 
where they were subject to direct rule by the federal government.l52 For 
many Indians, this space paired a denial of citizenship with the imposition 
of Congress's legislative authority.153 
The practical consequence of the further concentration of federal 
power in Indian affairs was evident by the increased rate of Indian 
dispossession and overt attempts at forced assimilation. The Indian 
Appropriations Act of 1871 ushered in later legislation such as the General 
Allotment Act of 1887 that directed the wide-scale allotment of Indian 
lands and the sale of surplus lands to white settlers.l54 By 1934, more than 
86 million acres155-more than two-thirds of the tribal land base prior to 
allotment-had been lost through disposition to non-Indians.l56 The 
149. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566. 
150. See id. 
151. See Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566. 
152. See Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and Territorial 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 670-71 (2013). 
153. See id. (noting Indian tribes are "subject to unusually broad federal 
authority"); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884) (holding Indians are not citizens 
under the Constitution). 
154. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, §§ 1, 5, 24 Stat. 388, 
390. 
155. Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination 
Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 142 (1977). 
156. See, e.g., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 66, 
§ 1.04, at 74. 
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massive transfer of individual allotments to white ownership was 
completed through a variety of means, including fraud, abuse of child 
guardianship proceedings, and murder.l57 The dispossession of Indian lands 
also occurred simultaneously with the wholesale removal of Indian children 
from their families; during the latter quarter of the 19th century, federal 
appropriations for Indian boarding schools grew dramatically year after 
year,158 as Captain Richard Pratt implemented a program to "kill the 
Indian ... to save the man. "159 The legal incorporation of Indian tribes was 
complete, though the incorporation at this point primarily served to subject 
tribes to federal plenary control, shield federal authority from judicial 
accountability, and facilitate the transfer of Indian lands and resources to 
federal and settler control. Worcester's doctrine of tribal self-governance 
and autonomy from state interference proved to be of little practical 
consequence when the federal government directly promoted the interests 
of states and local actors seeking title to Indian lands. 
Despite the oppressively assimilative exercise of congressional 
plenary power during the periods of removal and allotment, doctrinal 
recognition of inherent sovereignty persisted. In Kagama, for example, the 
Court reiterated its recognition of tribal inherent sovereignty and 
autonomy within the same breath that it articulated the expansive plenary 
power in Indian affairs. The Court declared that Indian tribes, though not 
regarded as states or foreign nations, are nevertheless regarded "as having 
a semi-independent position ... as a separate people, with the power of 
regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought 
under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they 
resided. "160 
Ten years later, the Supreme Court affirmed in Talton v. Mayes that 
157. WILLIAM T. HAGAN, AMERICAN INDIANS 115-16 (4th ed. 2013) 
(describing tactics such as white real estate agents encouraging Indians to lease their 
interests to white farmers; non-Indians preparing wills in which Indians would devise 
their interests to them; the abuse of guardianship proceedings by non-Indians to obtain 
control over children's allotments; and even bombing sleeping children to acquire 
control over Indian property interests). 
158. FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO 
ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880-1920, at 60 (1984). 
159. See Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History 
and the Nation's Debt to the Indian People, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 941, 944 
(1999). 
160. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886). But see id. at 383-
84 (articulating expansive plenary power). 
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Indian tribes exercised powers of self-government that "are not operated 
upon by the Fifth Amendment, which ... had for its sole object to control 
the powers conferred by the Constitution on the National Government."161 
In Talton, the Supreme Court again applied Worcester's principle that 
tribes retained their "original natural rights" as "distinct, independent 
political communities"162-and also applied Cherokee Nation's principle 
that tribes are "capable of managing [their) own affairs and governing 
[themselves)."163 Thus, congressional plenary power in Indian affairs did 
not destroy the inherent character of Indian tribes. Furthermore, Talton 
highlights the unique place of Indian tribes within the U.S. political system 
as sites where subnational sovereignty and autonomy reside subject to 
congressional plenary power, yet free of the constitutional prohibitions that 
restrict the federal government.164 Later, in United States v. Wheeler, the 
Supreme Court would apply this principle of inherent tribal sovereignty 
again, holding that because tribes and the federal government are 
"separate sovereigns," the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a federal 
prosecution that follows a tribal criminal trial.165 
The persistent recognition of tribes as separate sovereigns with the 
power to govern themselves also marks an important distinction regarding 
the exercise of plenary power in Indian affairs. Although the federal 
government pursued a policy of assimilating Indians during this period, it 
did not move to fully absorb tribes within one homogenous body politic. 
Although not universally true, many tribes continued their separate 
existence without being forced into extinction and subsumed under 
exclusive federal and state jurisdiction.l66 That they suffered immeasurably 
as a result of federal policies in Indian affairs is beyond doubt, but they also 
survived as polities with independent political self-determination. The 
combination of plenary power in Indian affairs with inherent tribal 
sovereignty brought tribes within federalism's requirement of shared rule 
with self-rule. 




Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). 
Id. at 383 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 
163. Id. (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831)). 
164. See id. at 384. 
165. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978). 
166. See, e.g., Laurence M. Hauptman, Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christy: A 
Background Study, 46 BUFF. L. REv. 947, 954 (1998). 
804 Drake Law Review [Vol. 62 
peoples, Congress enacted the Snyder Act, also known as the Citizenship 
to Indians Act of 1924.167 Although many Indians obtained citizenship prior 
to this date through a variety of legal mechanisms,168 approximately one-
third did not until the Act's passage.l69 The Act effectively conferred 
citizenship on all Indians, although many were still denied the rights to 
vote, attend school, or sit on juries.170 To clarify that the continued trust 
status of Indian allotments was not affected by the Act, the statute also 
clarified that the conferral of citizenship did not impair any Indian property 
rights.I71 
Just as the assertion of federal power in Indian affairs created a 
backlash during the Cherokee cases, federal conferral of Indian citizenship 
also created a backlash in some states. In 1925, the year after the Snyder 
Act passed, Alaska passed the Alaska Literacy Act in an effort to restrict 
Alaska Natives' access to the polls.I72 Some states acknowledged federal 
citizenship but continued to deny Indians state citizenshipP3 
167. Citizenship to Indians Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012)). 
168. Prior to 1924, many Indians attained citizenship by a variety of means, 
including in accordance with treaty terms, under section 6 of the General Allotment 
Act, through receipt of a patent in fee simple under the Burke Act of 1906, through 
military service, or under the provisions of special legislation applicable to Indians in 
specific territories or enrolled in specific tribes. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW, supra note 68, § 14.01[3], at 928-29. The Fourteenth Amendment's 
conferral of citizenship on "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof" was held inapplicable to Indians. U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV,§ 1; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94,102 (1884). 
169. Daniel McCool, Indian Voting, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE 
TwENTIETH CENTURY 105, 107 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 1985). 
170. Dalia Tsuk, The New Deal Origins of American Legal Pluralism, 19 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 189,205 (2001). 
171. Citizenship to Indians Act of 1924, § 1. 
172. Terrence M. Cole, Jim Crow in Alaska: The Passage of the Alaska Equal 
Rights Act of !945, 23 W. HIST. Q. 429,433 (1992) (citing Stephen W. Haycox, William 
Paul, Sr., and the Alaska Voters' Literacy Act of 1925, ALASKAHIST. 2,17-35 (1986)). 
173. Indians did not have citizenship in Arizona or New Mexico until1948 and 
they lacked citizenship in Utah until 1957. See Montoya v. Bolack, 372 P.2d 387, 390, 
394 (N.M. 1962) (referencing a 1948 unreported federal district court case, Trujillo v. 
Garley, that first gave Indians the right to vote in that state); Allen v. Merrell, 353 U.S. 
932, 932 (1957) (dismissing an appeal from the Utah Supreme Court because the 
parties stipulated the issue was moot); McCool, supra note 169, at 108 (noting the issue 
was moot because Utah's legislature had granted Indian suffrage). Compare Porter v. 
Hall, 271 P. 411, 419 (Ariz. 1928) (concluding that Indians were "under guardianship" 
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Ultimately, as barriers to the polls were removed, citizenship further 
incorporated Indians into the U.S. polity, offering long-awaited rights for 
those who had fought discrimination174 but imposing an unwanted status 
vehemently resisted by others.175 During the early 20th century, U.S. 
citizenship was considered incompatible with membership in a tribe.176 But 
by 1916, the Supreme Court overruled this notion by holding that 
citizenship was "not incompatible with tribal existence or continued 
guardianship, and so may be conferred without completely emancipating 
the Indians or placing them beyond the reach of congressional regulations 
adopted for their protection. "177 A result of U.S. citizenship is the 
strengthening of Indian American political voices and corresponding 
increases in the responsiveness and accountability of elected officials to 
their tribal constituents.11s 
and therefore ineligible to vote under the state constitution), with Harrison v. Laveen, 
196 P.2d 456,463 (Ariz. 1948) (overruling Porter). 
174. FRED PAUL, THEN FIGHT FOR IT! 41-44 (2003) (documenting the efforts 
of Alaska Natives who demanded the right to vote in southeast Alaska). 
175. Clinton Rickard, leader of the Tuscaroras, reportedly stated that "[t)he 
Citizenship Act did pass in 1924 despite our strong opposition. By its provisions all 
Indians were automatically made United States citizens whether they wanted to be so 
or not. This was a violation of our sovereignty. Our citizenship was in our own 
nations." FIGHTING TuSCARORA: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF CLINTON RICKARD 
53 (Barbara Graymont ed., 1973). 
176. In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 493-94 (1905) (holding that a federal statute 
prohibiting the disbursement of alcohol to members of Native American tribes cannot 
reach to a Native American who is a citizen of the United States), overruled by United 
States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916). 
177. Nice, 241 U.S. at 598 (footnote omitted). 
178. However, in most cases, tribal member populations are too small and 
geographically dispersed to exert real political influence. Indians comprise more than 
10 percent of the population in only three states: Alaska, Oklahoma, and New Mexico. 
In most states, Indians comprise less than 2 percent of the population. See generally 
Voting Age Population by Citizenship and Race (CVAP), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/rdo/datalvoting_age_population_by_citizenship_and_race_cvap. 
html (click "CSV" or "SAS" under "2008-2012 American Community Survey 5 year 
estimates" then open "State" spreadsheet) (last updated Mar. 12, 2014). Despite their 
small numbers, the Indian vote played a potentially decisive role in two high-profile 
cases involving the election of Senator Tim Johnson of South Dakota in 2002 and the 
ouster of Senator Slade Gordon of Washington in 2000. Daniel Kraker, Tribes Turn 
Out to Vote, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 16, 2004, http://www.hcn.org/issues/280/ 
14932. 
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4. Indian Reorganization 
In 1928, Lewis Meriam submitted his commissioned report, "The 
Problem of Indian Administration," to the Secretary of the InteriorY9 The 
report documented the results of allotment: the economic basis of the 
Indians' traditional way of life had been destroyed, and an overwhelming 
majority of Indians were living in grinding poverty.l80 The policy of 
allotment had forced Indians to adapt to an agrarian way of life on land 
unsuited for such use, and it broke up the tribal land mass and the social 
fabric of Indian communal life.181 Furthermore, the breakup of tribal 
landholdings and communal life had devastated tribal governance 
structures and traditional institutions.182 The 847-page report helped turn 
the tide from the pro-assimilative focus of federal Indian policy to the pro-
sovereignty focus of the mid-1930s to mid-1940s.183 
Within the Department of the Interior, John Collier and Felix Cohen 
collaborated on changing the morally bankrupt policies that had decimated 
Indian communities.184 While Collier served as Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs and Cohen as Associate Solicitor, the two collaborated to draft new 
legislation that would profoundly change Indian policy.t85 By 1934, 
Congress enacted their work product, the Wheeler-Howard Act, also 
known as the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).l86 
The IRA formally repudiated the policy of allotment and indefinitely 
extended the trust status preventing the further alienation of Indian 
lands.t87 Section 16 of the IRA also promoted Indian self-governance by 
affirming the federal government's recognition of the right of tribes to 
179. LEWIS MERIAM, INST. FOR GOV'T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN 
ADMINISTRATION (1928) [hereinafter MERIAM REPORT), available at http://www.narf. 
org/nill/resources/meriam.htm. 
180. !d. at 6. 
181. See id. at 6-8. 
182. ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 56-57 (2000). 
183. Ironically, however, the report itself recommended greater resources for 
Indian education and for the eventual assimilation of Indians, rather than greater 
support for tribal self-governance. MERIAM REPORT, supra note 179, at 21. 
184. See Rusco, supra note 182, at 192-96. 
185. See id. at 195-96. 
186. Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 70-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2012)). 
187. Id. §§ 1-2. 
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organize for their common welfare and adopt tribal constitutions.l88 The 
Department of the Interior's efforts to assist tribes with drafting 
constitutions was flawed and assimilative because federal officials 
circulated a model constitution and a constitution "outline" that was ill-
suited to tribal governance.l89 Others have reported that Interior officials 
circulated a model corporate charter in place of constitutional provisions.190 
Nevertheless, the IRA constituted an important shift away from the 
policies of assimilation and allotment toward greater respect and support 
for inherent tribal sovereignty. 
In October of 1934, the Solicitor of the Interior also issued an opinion 
on the "Powers of Indian Tribes."191 This opinion, likely authored by 
Cohen, offered the Solicitor's interpretation of Section 16 of the IRA's 
reference to "powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing 
law."192 The opinion described a nonexhaustive set of broad-ranging 
powers of local self-government.193 The opinion also incorporated the 
"most basic principle of all Indian law" that "those powers which are 
lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers 
granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a 
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished. "194 
By the close of Cohen's tenure in the Office of the Solicitor of the 
Department of the Interior in 1948, federal policies had experienced 
dramatic changes in Indian affairs. The tremendous loss of the Indian land 
base had been stanched, the IRA had supported a resurgence of institution 
building within tribal governments, and Cohen had completed a massive 
synthesis and summary of Indian law in the form of the Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law.195 The Handbook, in turn, increased the coherence of 
Indian law and emphasized reserved rights and tribal powers of self-
government within a regime that recognized a broad federal plenary power 
188. Id. § 16. 
189. See David E. Wilkins, Introduction to FELIX S. COHEN, ON THE 
DRAFTING OF TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONS, at xi, xxii (David E. Wilkins ed., 2007). 
190. Id. at xxiii. 
191. Nathan R. Margold, Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Decisions of the Dep't 
of the Interior.14, 17 (1934). 
192. ld. at 17-18; see Indian Reorganization Act § 16 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
193. Margold, supra note 191, at 30-65. 
194. !d. at 19 (emphasis removed). 
195. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 68. 
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in Indian affairs but tempered it with subconstitutional norms that 
mediated its harshness.t96 
In federalism terms, the Indian reorganization era produced greater 
standing for tribes as functional constituent sovereigns within the United 
States. The "shared rule" force of plenary power remained regnant, while 
the "self-rule" aspect of federalism underwent a resurgence through the 
IRA's support for institution-building and greater respect for self-
governance. In addition, the legal norms articulated by Cohen in the 
Handbook and adopted by the Solicitor of the Interior provided firmer 
entrenchment for tribal autonomy. 
5. Termination 
By the late 1940s, several factors coalesced leading to the shift from 
the Indian New Deal era to the mid-20th century policy of termination of 
Indian tribes. These factors included increasing exasperation with the 
expensive and corrupt administrative machinery in Indian affairs, a desire 
to "emancipate" Indians from their dependence on the federal 
government, persistent demand for greater ownership and control of 
Indian lands and resources, and the departures of Collier and Cohen from 
federal office.197 
The termination era was formally introduced in 1953 with House 
Concurrent Resolution 108, a general policy statement that resolved that 
"at the earliest possible time," all of several tribes located in certain 
specified states and several additional tribes located in other states "should 
be freed from Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities and 
limitations specially applicable to Indians."198 The policy was followed by 
14 separate statutes that initiated the termination of 109 tribes, affecting 
about three percent of the nation's population of Indians enrolled in 
federally recognized tribes.l99 Termination statutes were then followed by 
plans that detailed how land would be transferred from restricted trust 
status to freely alienable, privately owned land.20° For the affected tribes, 
196. See id. §§ 4.01[2][a], 5.02[1], at 213,391. 
197. See Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 155, at 145-49. Collier resigned in 
1945. S. LYMAN TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 147 (1973). Cohen died in 1953. 
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 66, at viii. 
198. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. 132 (1953). 
199. Wilkinson & Biggs, supra note 155, at 151. 
200. Id. at 151-52. 
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termination ultimately ended the unique federal-tribal relationship, 
transferred many of the duties and powers in Indian affairs from the 
federal government to the states, and exposed tribal members to the 
neglect and discriminatory treatment of the states.201 
In Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, the Supreme Court 
examined whether the termination act adopted for the Menominee Tribe 
abrogated the tribe's treaty rights to hunt and fish.202 The Court concluded 
that the termination act's silence as to treaty rights implied that no 
abrogation had occurred, stating, "We decline to construe the Termination 
Act as a back-handed way of abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of 
these Indians. While the power to abrogate those rights exists[,] 'the 
intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to 
Congress."'203 The Menominee decision provides a powerful illustration of 
the Court's traditional role in mediating congressional plenary power in 
Indian affairs. Even in the midst of Congress's darkest hour in federal-
tribal relations, legislation purporting to terminate federal supervision over 
Indians was interpreted by the Court with attention to the clear and 
explicit intentions of Congress.204 Without a clear statement of intent to 
abrogate tribal rights, including treaty rights, those rights would persevere. 
Public Law 83-280 (PL 280) constituted another legislative tool of 
assimilation during the termination era. Enacted in 1953, it transferred 
partial civil and complete criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians to 
five consenting states and any others that agreed to participate.205 At first, 
this transfer of jurisdiction to the states proceeded regardless of tribal 
consent or resistance.206 It did not involve any change in the restricted-trust 
status of Indian lands or any transfer of ownership of those lands.207 In 
201. !d. at 152. 
202. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 408 (1968). 
203. !d. at 412-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Pigeon River Improvement, 
Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S.138, 160 (1934)). 
204. !d. at 413. 
205. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub L. No. 83-280, §§ 2, 7, 67 Stat. 588, 588-90 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C. (2012)). 
206. See id. § 7; see also Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of 
State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 538 (1975). The 
statute was later amended in 1968 to require Indian consent for future assertions of 
state jurisdiction. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 401, 82 
Stat. 73, 78-79 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012)). 
207. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, §§ 2(b), 4(b). 
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Bryan v. Itasca County, the Supreme Court affirmed that PL 280's transfer 
of jurisdiction to the states did not include civil regulatory authority over 
Indians and their lands.208 As a result, the states lacked the power to tax 
Indians and their on-reservation property.209 The state courts did possess 
jurisdiction to adjudicate civil causes of action arising on the reservation 
involving tribal members, however, and state criminal laws applied to 
reservations in full force.210 
In 1955, the Supreme Court also decided Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. 
United States, one of its most devastating Indian-law decisions. In that case, 
the Court concluded that the Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Tlingit Indians was not 
entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment when the federal 
government contracted for the sale of timber resources on lands that the 
Tee-Hit-Ton had traditionally occupied.211 The Tee-Hit-Tons held original 
Indian title to these lands within the area of the Tongass National Forest.212 
Under the discovery doctrine, the Tee-Hit-Tons held the right to use and 
occupy the land.213 In authorizing the sale of timber located on this 
territory, Congress had specified that its resolution neither recognized nor 
denied the validity of indigenous possessory rights to the land,214 and it 
required that all sales' proceeds be held in a special account until 
indigenous land rights could be determined.215 The Supreme Court, in an 
opinion by Justice Stanley Reed, found that original Indian title could 
lawfully be taken without any right to compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment.216 The Court concluded it was "well settled" that upon 
discovery, Indians remained on the land only with the "permission from 
the whites to occupy" their land.217 To justify this outright denial of a core 
constitutional right to property, Justice Reed offered a narrative of the 
conquest of North America's "savages": 
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this 
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, 
208. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976). 
209. !d. 
210. !d. at 385-86. 
211. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272,288-91 (1955). 
212. !d. at 276. 
213. !d. at 279. 
214. !d. at 276. 
215. !d. 
216. !d. at 284-85. 
217. !d. at 279. 
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even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for 
blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will 
that deprived them of their land.z1s 
811 
Thus, Tee-Hit-Ton represents the continuing capacity of the judiciary 
during the termination era to deny fundamental property rights for Indians. 
The policies of the termination era demonstrate that congressional 
plenary power includes the power to completely deny the recognition of 
tribal sovereignty and eliminate the legal barriers to protect tribal 
autonomy from state authority. In addition to the power to terminate and 
abrogate, plenary power may also explicitly authorize state authority 
within Indian country. Furthermore, as Tee-Hit-Ton demonstrates, when 
plenary power is used to expropriate Indian lands and resources, Congress 
has no legally recognized obligation to provide just compensation under 
the Fifth Amendment for the taking.219 
Despite the termination era's destructive assertion of federal power in 
Indian affairs, tribal sovereignty and treaty rights demonstrated a critical 
capacity to persevere. On the ground, this persistence is reflected in the rise 
of coordinated activism by tribal leaders to protect tribal powers and 
oppose termination policies.220 In the courts, this persistence is best 
represented by Williams v. Lee. In that case, the Supreme Court held that 
the Arizona courts lacked jurisdiction to hear a civil claim filed by a non-
Indian retailer against a Navajo couple to collect for goods sold to the 
couple on the reservation for credit.221 The Court acknowledged that 
Congress had the power to authorize state jurisdiction over such matters, 
as it had for some states under PL 280.222 But in the absence of any clear 
expression of Congress's intent to allow state jurisdiction over Indian 
defendants, the Court held that the Navajo Nation court system had 
exclusive jurisdiction over the claim.223 The Court also announced the 
general rule that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has 
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation 
218. !d. at 289-90. 
219. !d. at 288-89. 
220. STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN 
POLITICAL RESURGENCE 124-25 (1988); THOMAS W. COWGER, THE NATIONAL 
CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS: THE FOUNDING YEARS 3-4 (1999). 
221. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,223 (1959). 
222. Id. at 220-21. 
223. Id. at 222. 
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Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."224 Later, the 
Supreme Court also affirmed in Menominee that Indian treaty rights are 
retained unless explicitly abrogated by Congress.225 Similarly, Bryan again 
illustrated that congressional authorization of state authority within Indian 
country must be clear and explicit and will not be implied.226 
From a federalism standpoint, the termination era underscores the 
fundamental weakness of existing legal safeguards for tribal autonomy. 
Unlike the states, tribal sovereignty lacks explicit constitutional 
entrenchment and is correspondingly much more vulnerable to legal 
change. 
6. Self-Determination 
On July 8, 1970, President Richard Nixon delivered his famous 
message to Congress formally repudiating the termination policy and 
endorsing self-determination for tribal governments. The first two 
paragraphs of the message stated: 
The first Americans-the Indians-are the most deprived and most 
isolated minority group in our nation. On virtually every scale of 
measurement-employment, income, education, health-the condition 
of the Indian people ranks at the bottom. 
This condition is the heritage of centuries of injustice .... Even the 
Federal programs which are intended to meet their needs have 
frequently proven to be ineffective and demeaning.227 
The message pronounced that "[t)he time has come to break decisively 
with the past and to create the conditions for a new era in which the Indian 
future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions. "228 The message 
went on to state that the policy of termination was wrong, both because it 
abrogated the treaty commitments of the United States toward tribes and 
because it was economically and socially disastrous for the affected 
224. !d. at 220. 
225. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 
(1968). 
226. See Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976). 
227. RICHARD NIXON, PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE 
AMERICAN INDIANS-MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. NO. 91-363, 116 
CONG. REC. 23258 (1970). 
228. /d. 
2014] The First Federalists 813 
tribes.229 The message added that "[s]elf-determination among the Indian 
people can and must be encouraged without the threat of eventual 
termination. "230 
The legislature responded by enacting several statutes that affirmed 
Indian self-determination. In 1973, Congress restored the federal 
recognition of the Menominee Tribe.231 In later years, Congress passed 
more than a dozen restoration acts for other tribes that had been 
terrninated.232 Congress also enacted several statutes that promoted tribal 
self-deterrnination,233 including the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act of 1975, which provides for the transfer of 
federal programs and services to tribal governments for tribal 
administration.234 
Beginning in 1988, Congress also authorized a tribal self-governance 
demonstration project modeled after a block-grant approach to state 
program administration.235 The program was reauthorized and expanded in 
1994236 and made permanent in 2000.237 Participating tribes are eligible to 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-197, § 3, 87 Stat. 770 (1973) 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 903 (2012)). 
232. See Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 318, 338-39 (2006). 
233. See, e.g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, § 2, 88 Stat. 
77, 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1451); Tribally Controlled Community College 
Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-471, § 101, 92 Stat. 1325, 1325 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 1901); Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-382, § 3, 96 
Stat. 1938, 1938 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2102); Indian Tribal Government Tax Status 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 202, 96 Stat. 2607, 2608 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 7871); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. 100-497, §§ 2-3, 102 Stat. 2467, 
2467 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2702); Native American Graves Protection 
and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601, § 3, 104 Stat. 3048, 3050-51 (1990) (codified 
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 3002); National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 
Pub. L. No. 101-630, §§ 302-303, 104 Stat. 4532, 4532-33 (1990); Indian Tribal Energy 
Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 502, 119 Stat. 
763, 763-68 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3502). 
234. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
638, § 3(b), 88 Stat. 2203,2204 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b)). 
235. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 
Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, § 209, 102 Stat. 2285, 2296. 
236. Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, § 402, 108 Stat. 
4272 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 458bb). 
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exercise broad flexibility over the transferred resources, including the 
power to redesign and consolidate programs and services to meet local 
needs and the power to reallocate funds between them.23s 
In the area of criminal law, Congress has also enacted legislation to 
strengthen tribal governance. The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 
(TLOA), for example, amends the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) to 
acknowledge tribal court authority to impose sentences of up to three years 
if certain protections are offered by the tribal court.239 The Act also 
promotes increased cooperation and information sharing between tribal, 
state, and federal law enforcement agencies,240 and it requires regular 
collection of data regarding Indian country crimes.241 In 2013, Congress also 
adopted legislation recognizing the inherent power of tribes to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit acts of domestic 
violence, dating violence, or violate a protection order in Indian country.242 
This legislation, included within the reauthorization of the Violence 
Against Women Act, also requires that tribes provide free indigent defense 
counsel for offenders, law-trained and licensed judges, published criminal 
laws, and a jury selected from a pool that includes a fair cross section of the 
community. 243 
While many acts of Congress in the self-determination era have 
aimed to promote tribal independence and autonomy, some have imposed 
individual-rights protections on tribal governments. The cornerstone of the 
effort to assimilate tribes to Western norms of individual-rights protection 
is the ICRA of 1968. This Act imposes several Bill of Rights-like 
protections on Indian tribes, including the right to due process and equal 
237. See Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 
§§ 2(4)-(6), 3(1), 114 Stat. 711, 711-12. 
238. 25 U.S.C. § 458aaa-5(e). 
239. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234, 124 Stat. 
2261, 2279-82 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1302). Prior to the passage of the Act, the Indian 
Civil Rights Act acknowledged tribal court authority to impose sentences of up to one 
year. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2006). TLOA authorizes sentences of up to three years if the 
tribal court provides defendants with an indigent defense attorney at the tribe's 
expense, provides a law-trained and licensed judge, and publishes the tribe's criminal 
laws. !d.§ 1302(b)-(c) (2012). 
240. Tribal Law and Order Act of2010, § 222 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2815). 
241. !d. § 212 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2809(a)(2), (4)). 
242. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub L. No. 113-4, 
§ 904, 127 Stat. 54, 120--23 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304). 
243. !d. § 904(d). 
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protection of tribal laws; freedom of religion, speech, the press, and 
assembly; freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, double jeopardy, 
self-incrimination, and takings without just compensation; and several 
special procedural rights for criminal defendants, such as the right to a 
speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation, to confront witnesses, to subpoena witnesses, and to obtain 
assistance of counsel.244 The ICRA does not incorporate all constitutional 
protections. It does not guarantee a republican form of government or 
protect freedom from establishment of religion, nor does it protect the 
right to receive free assistance of counsel for indigent criminal defendants 
or the right to receive a jury trial in civil cases.245 These omissions reflect an 
intentional choice by Congress to accommodate tribal sovereignty and 
cultural distinctiveness and to avoid costly resource commitments the tribes 
could not afford.246 
Although the ICRA's imposition of civil rights protections constitutes 
a heavy-handed application of congressional plenary power, the statute 
also promotes tribal independence in its application, interpretation, and 
enforcement. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme Court noted 
that "[i]n addition to its objective of strengthening the position of 
individual tribal members vis-a-vis the tribe [by enacting the ICRA], 
Congress also intended to promote the well-established federal 'policy of 
furthering Indian self-government."'247 To further this congressional policy, 
the Court refused to infer that the ICRA created an implied federal cause 
of action for enforcement of the Act's provisions beyond the Act's specific 
authorization of federal habeas review.248 The Court concluded that federal 
review for all claims under the Act "plainly would be at odds with ... 
protecting tribal self-government," because it would "undermine the 
authority of tribal forums" and "impose serious financial burdens" on 
tribal governments.249 The Court also emphasized that tribal forums are not 
244. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 73, 77-
78 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1302). 
245. In addition, the ICRA does not prohibit tribes from abridging the 
privileges and immunities of citizens, and it does not require a grand jury indictment 
prior to the initiation of criminal prosecutions. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U.S. 49, 63 n.14 (1978); see also WILKINSON, supra note 77, at 216 n.136 (noting the lack 
of privileges and immunities in the ICRA). 
246. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62-64. 
247. /d. at 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). 
248. /d. at 64. 
249. /d. 
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only available to hear ICRA claims,250 but they are also in a superior 
position to evaluate the claims in light of tribal tradition and custom.251 
The congressional policy of tribal self-determination has bolstered the 
role of tribes as integral participants in the nation's federal system. The rise 
of federal-tribal self-determination contracts and self-governance compacts 
has triggered a revolution in tribal government administration. As 
programs and services have devolved from federal to tribal control, tribes 
have begun to exercise greater discretion and authority over their affairs 
and resources. And as tribal capacities are developed in areas tied to 
federal devolution, they create generalizable forms of expertise that can be 
translated to support governance across a wider range of policy issues.zsz 
Congressional support of tribal law enforcement has also injected 
tribal governments with a powerful stimulant. The TLOA, for example, 
supports a variety of programs for the development of tribal justice 
systems. The combination of the TLOA and the Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act creates new incentives for the continued development 
of tribal courts and law enforcement capacities. As a result of these 
statutes, in the next five years there will likely be significant growth in the 
availability of public defenders in Indian country. This influx is likely to 
trigger important changes in criminal procedure law applied in tribal 
courts. Furthermore, tribal courts are likely to become more familiar to 
local non-Indian communities as they strive to meet the Violence Against 
Women Reauthorization Act's new jury pool requirements for 
prosecutions of non-Indians under the statute's domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction provisions. 
Finally, Congress's policy of promoting self-determination has also 
included protection for tribal autonomy from external interference. As 
Martinez indicated, tribal courts are the exclusive forum for the vindication 
of most claims that arise under the ICRA.253 Unless a petitioner is detained 
and eligible to file a habeas petition, all ICRA claims are adjudicated by 
tribal courts.254 Thus, the Martinez Court remained faithful to the original 
principle that the judiciary must mediate the harshness of congressional 
250. Id. at 65. 
251. Id. at 71. 
252. LAURA E. EvANS, POWER FROM POWERLESSNESS: TRIBAL 
GOVERNMENTS, INSTITUTIONAL NICHES, AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM 201--02 (2011). 
253. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 65. 
254. See id. at 58, 65. 
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plenary power by requiring a clear statement of Congress's intent before 
legislation is interpreted to diminish tribal prerogatives.255 In addition to 
affirming that the ICRA did not create an implied federal cause of action, 
Martinez also recognized that tribal governments enjoy sovereign 
immunity, and such immunity can only be waived by the tribe or 
Congress's unequivocal expression.256 
Ultimately, the cumulative result of Congress's legislation during the 
self-determination era and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
ICRA is that tribes have assumed an integral role in the federal system. 
Tribal governments satisfy the most crucial aspects of federalism: they 
possess their own sovereignty within a broader national system that 
includes centralized federal authority, they make their own laws and 
engage in practical governance in distinctive ways, and they possess a 
degree of autonomy from external interference. 
Ill. THE FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT OF TRIBAL FEDERALISM 
A. The Case for Federalism's Values 
In any federal system, conflict over the scope and content of each 
sovereign's authority is inevitable, so the judiciary often plays a crucial 
interpretive role. Debates about federalism that involve tensions between 
federal and state rights frequently begin as questions of constitutional 
interpretation, such as the extent of Congress's enumerated Article I 
powers, the meaning and force of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,257 
and the structure that these provisions implicitly establish. In addition, 
federalism disputes often require an examination of history and precedent. 
Yet constitutional law, history, and precedent still frequently leave 
substantial gray areas for conflicts. Within these spaces, theories about the 
values and purposes of federalism frequently provide a critical persuasive 
weight that often tilts the balance in favor of a particular outcome.258 These 
255. I d. at 64, 72. 
256. I d. at 58-59. 
257. For a discussion of the role that statutory interpretation may play in 
interpreting legislation providing for state implementation of federal laws, see Gluck, 
supra note 19. 
258. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) ("If the allegations 
here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide ... a remedy for the 
conduct of respondent Morrison. But under our federal system that remedy must be 
provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States."); Alden v. 
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theories are especially relevant to judicial decisionmaking when they 
reflect the values that the federal system was originally intended to 
promote.259 Furthermore, the values and purposes of federalism are 
relevant to judicial review to the extent that judges subjectively find these 
values to be compelling and worthy of promotion in society.260 
When questions regarding the scope and limits of tribal authority 
require evaluation, a different set of considerations generally apply. The 
Constitution's silence on the source, nature, or limits of tribal sovereignty 
offer little direct exposition on tribal powers. Instead, the Indian 
Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and the Treaty Clause provide a 
normative platform that supports a framework for tribal powers.261 Other 
relevant sources include the content of treaty rights, congressional 
legislation, history, and judicially created doctrine that combines the 
Court's prudential commitments with past precedents on tribal sovereignty 
and jurisdiction.262 To a significant extent, tribal jurisdictional questions 
involve very little guidance from positive law, leaving tremendous room for 
ambiguity.263 
Within the spaces created by this ambiguity, theories about the values 
and purposes of federalism are almost never applied to tribal jurisdictional 
disputes. Instead, tribal governance is usually framed as an archaic right 
whose recognition must be balanced against the costs the courts presume it 
imposes on society.264 Tribal governance, unlike state governance, is almost 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) ("In light of history, practice, precedent, and the 
structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from private suit 
in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by 
Article I legislation."); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
567 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992). 
259. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see also ANTHONY J. 
BELLIA JR., FEDERALISM 208 (2011 ). 
260. See New York, 505 U.S. at 211 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (eschewing the idea that federalism values mandate a particular 
government structure); see also BELLIA, supra note 259, at 208. 
261. See Frank Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 
S.D. L. REV. 239, 240 (1991). 
262. See id. at 241-42. 
263. !d. at 251. 
264. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980) ("The principle of tribal self-government ... 
seeks an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the Federal 
Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other."). 
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never viewed as a benefit that improves society's welfare by unlocking 
federalism's potential. 
My proposal for a functional evaluation of tribal governance in light 
of federalism's values is likely to meet resistance from all corners. From the 
states'-rights perspective, tribes are probably considered inappropriate 
beneficiaries of the accommodations that often extend to the states. Unlike 
states, tribes are not parties to the compact that formed the Union, and 
they did not gain a constitutional guarantee of their rights as the states did. 
Furthermore, the values of federalism are properly understood as rooted in 
the aims of the Founders, and the tribes were never part of the Founders' 
federalism design. 
While these claims have validity, they do not succeed in keeping 
functional federalism arguments beyond the tribes' reach. Tribes may be 
outsiders to the constitutional compact, but the Constitution does not 
forbid their federalism or mandate their exclusion. As my argument in Part 
I establishes, tribal governance constitutes a form of federalism, and it has 
become integrated into U.S. federalism through the system's gradual 
evolution. In fact, the progressive entrenchment of tribal federalism 
frequently proceeded in response to maneuvers that were made to promote 
effective governance. Tribal federalism, then, has its own history and 
origins, and much of that origin story involves federalism's values. 
While states'-rights proponents are likely to grumble, tribal advocates 
are also likely to pause at this proposal. Tribal sovereignty is exceptional, 
and comparisons between tribes and states are frequently treacherous 
endeavors that risk sacrificing what is unique and essential to tribal 
sovereignty.265 Furthermore, federalism's values are frequently perceived as 
opportunistic rhetoric in support of specific substantive ends.266 Tribal 
governments can never win on the playing field of federalism, where the 
265. See PhilipP. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public 
Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 433,437-43 (2005); Carole Goldberg, Critique by Comparison 
in Federal Indian Law, 82 N.D. L. REV. 719, 733-34 (2006). 
266. Lynn A. Baker & Sanford Levinson, Twenty-Year Legacy of South 
Dakota v. Dole: Dole Dialogue, 52 S.D. L. REv. 468, 487 (2007) ("[O]pportunistic 
embrace of federalism when it is convenient to attaining one's substantive ends is quite 
different from a more general commitment to federalism, where one would have to 
take the quite-often bitter with the only-sometimes sweet."); Elizabeth Weeks 
Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health 
Reform, 39 HOFSTRA. L. REv. 111, 125-27 (2010) (describing examples of 
"opportunistic" federalism). 
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goalposts for states' rights are always located downhill. Finally, functional 
arguments in favor of tribal governance may be dangerous if they elevate 
Western notions of good governance over indigenous principles267 or if they 
displace treaty and inherent sovereignty claims or human rights claims 
based on the moral obligations of the United States toward its colonized 
indigenous peoples. Functional federalism arguments should not be used if 
they unfairly penalize tribal governments, which, weakened by centuries of 
policies designed to remove, acculturate, and assimilate them, are unable to 
pass muster in tests for effective governance that are likely to reflect 
Western ideals. 
Each of these concerns is valid and worthy of thorough engagement. I 
assert that tribes do not need to sacrifice the distinctiveness of their rights 
and powers to participate in debates about federalism's values. The claim 
that tribes participate in federalism does not require assumptions about 
tribal and state equivalence. Tribal federalism, due to its history of 
integration into the federal system and due to the character of tribal 
sovereignty, is unique and distinct from the position of states within the 
federal system. Accordingly, tribal use of functional arguments about 
federalism's values should not displace arguments based on treaty rights, 
inherent sovereignty, or commitments to respecting the human rights of 
native peoples. The rights of indigenous peoples to continued respect for 
their self-determination or their cultures, languages, lands, and resources 
should not depend on functional assessments of tribal governance. 
Instead, federalism's values may be most useful at the tipping point of 
tribal jurisdictional claims. In the gray areas in which tribal de facto 
sovereignty frequently fails to cross over into de jure recognition, such as 
where tribes exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers, federalism's values are 
most relevant. Furthermore, when state assertions of authority in Indian 
country hinge on a balancing of interests, courts should consider whether 
the state jurisdiction will interfere or promote effective governance. 
B. Core Values of Federalism 
The exercise of Article III power has allowed the federal courts to 
play a central role as the interpreters of the Constitution's federalism 
design. This engagement by the judiciary takes the constitutional text and 
structure as a starting point and looks to history and the Framers' intent to 
267. Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 
1060-61 (2007). 
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determine the purposes undergirding constitutional federalism. These 
factors then create a framework for filling in the interstices of the 
Constitution with compatible principles and doctrines. 
One complicating factor in the attempt to describe the values and 
purposes of federalism is the fact that this topic is rife with controversy. 
Just as the very existence of federalism in the United States is subject to 
challenge,268 so is each of the values that jurists and scholars have identified 
as key aspects of federalism. Furthermore, throughout the nation's history, 
several different interpretations of the federal system and its primary 
values and purposes have gained predominance, only to eventually yield in 
the face of alternative visions based on newly ascendant governance ideals 
and practices.269 
The purpose of this Article is not to provide a legal history of 
federalism interpretation in the United States but to map out several of the 
most significant values and purposes that have been used to decide 
questions about the proper allocation of federal and state powers. 
Professor Erin Ryan has summarized the many values promoted by 
federalism by grouping them into four separate clusters that each attend to 
good governance: 
(1) [T]he maintenance of checks and balances that safeguard 
individuals against tyranny; (2) the promotion of accountable and 
participatory democratic government; ... (3) the socially valuable 
benefits associated with local autonomy, especially diversity, 
innovation, and interjurisdictional competition ... ; [and] (4) the 
pragmatic problem-solving premise of federalism, by which the federal 
system enables the development and exchange of unique regulatory 
capacity to cope with interjurisdictional problems.27° 
These values are frequently cited in discussions about federalism within the 
courts, the academy, and the halls of the nation's lawmaking bodies. 
1. Checks and Balances 
One of the most commonly cited benefits of a federal structure of 
governance is the ability of the subnational sovereign to protect against 
268. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 25, at 115-23. 
269. See RYAN, supra note 33, at 68-104 (tracing the Supreme Court's use of 
different federalism theories throughout history). 
270. Id. at 38. 
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government abuse and overreach caused by the national sovereign, or vice 
versa. According to Alexander Hamilton, the separate sovereigns within 
the federal system would be able to prevent their counterparts from 
establishing a tyranny.271 For James Madison, the division of power into 
distinct governments was crucial because it provided the people with a 
"double security" against the abuse of their rights.272 
In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court considered the 
importance of the checks-and-balances value of federalism when it 
reviewed the lawfulness of the Missouri Constitution's mandatory 
retirement provision: 
Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on 
abuses of government power. "The constitutionally mandated balance 
of power between the States and the Federal Government was 
adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of our fundamental 
liberties." Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate 
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the 
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance 
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce 
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.273 
In 2011, Justice Anthony Kennedy also invoked the checks-and-
balances value of federalism in Bond v. United States.274 Kennedy's 
discussion emphasized that another aspect of the checks-and-balances 
value is the ability of one sovereign to provide an alternative forum for 
policymaking if barriers prevent individuals from using the institutions of 
the other sovereign within the federal system.275 This aspect of checks and 
balances is also referred to as the "regulatory backstop" function of 
federalism.276 Justice Kennedy wrote that federalism "allows States to 
respond, through the enactment of positive law, to the initiative of those 
who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times without having 
to rely solely upon the political processes that control a remote central 
271. THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 53, at 228. 
272. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 53, at 400. 
273. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
274. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
275. See id. 
276. RYAN, supra note 33, at 42. 
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power. "277 
2. Democratic Participation and Accountability 
In Gregory, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor emphasized that 
federalism "increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic 
processes."278 Since the United States was founded, federalism has been 
characterized as promoting effective governance by ensuring that elected 
representatives operate in spheres that are close to the people.279 Madison 
recognized the benefits of democratic participation in local governance in 
his papers when he observed that "within a small sphere, this voice [of the 
people] could be most easily collected, and the public affairs most 
accurately managed."280 Brutus, an antifederalist who published essays 
during the founding, argued that "[t)he confidence which the people have 
in their rulers, in a free republic, arises from their knowing them, from 
their being responsible to them for their conduct, and from the power they 
have of displacing them when they misbehave."281 Brutus viewed the 
national government as incapable of inspiring this confidence because of 
the remoteness of the seat of governance from the communities of most 
citizens.282 
Federalism is also linked to the value of democratic participation 
because many believe that it promotes civic engagement. If governance is 
local, then citizens are more likely to be willing to engage in public debate 
and act to promote the public good, even at the expense of individual self-
interest.283 Governance at the national level, in contrast, is frequently 
277. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
278. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. 
279. See LACROIX, supra note 29, at 156-58 (discussing early debates about 
centralized legislative power and the idea that states should have independent powers 
to address local issues); RYAN, supra note 33, at 44; SHAPIRO, supra note 8; Brenna 
Findley, Practical Observations on Politics and the Constitution, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 
1085, 1091-92 (2013). 
280. Letter from James Madison, Va. Delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention, to Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Minister to France (Oct. 24, 1787), in 5 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 17, 29 (Gaillard Hunted., 1904). 
281. HERBERT J. STORING, 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 370-71 
(1981). 
282. Id. at 371 ("The consequence will be, they will have no confidence in 
their legislature, suspect them of ambitious views, be jealous of every measure they 
adopt, and will not support the laws they pass."). 
283. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 
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characterized as too remote to foster a similar high level of engagement.284 
The Supreme Court has also invoked the value of democratic 
accountability in its Tenth Amendment anticommandeering cases. In New 
York v. United States, Justice O'Connor justified overturning the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 on the grounds 
that it unlawfully commandeered state legislative authority.285 O'Connor 
wrote, "[W]here the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the 
accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished. "286 She 
explained that "where the Federal Government directs the States to 
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public 
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program 
may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. "287 
Similarly, in the anticommandeering case of Printz v. United States, Justice 
Antonin Scalia emphasized that "[t]he Constitution ... contemplates that a 
State's government will represent and remain accountable to its own 
citizens."288 Although democratic accountability is widely accepted as an 
important value of federalism,289 the anticommandeering cases have been 
frequently criticized for relying on the unproven premise that citizens are 
unable to keep track of the level of government responsible for policy 
decisions felt at the locallevel.29° 
3. Local Autonomy 
A major advantage of a federal system is the capacity of subnational 
sovereigns to respond to local preferences and conditions. The writings of 
the founding generation reflect on this benefit. For example, Richard 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1510 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE 
FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1983)). 
284. See, e.g., id. ("The federal government is too distant and its compass too 
vast to permit extensive participation by ordinary citizens .... "); Findley, supra note 
279, at 1091-92. 
285. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
286. !d. at 168. 
287. !d. at 169. 
288. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,920 (1997). 
289. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 33, at 44; SHAPIRO, supra note 8; Vicki C. 
Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 2180, 2201 (1998). 
290. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 33, at 46-47; H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The 
Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 877 
(1999). 
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Henry Lee, who published essays as "the Federal Farmer," noted that "one 
government and general legislation alone, can never extend equal benefits 
to all parts of the United States: Different laws, customs, and opinions exist 
in the different states, which by a uniform system of laws would be 
unreasonably invaded. "291 In a letter to Lee, Samuel Adams also noted the 
near impossibility for one national government to generate laws for 
persons "living in Climates so remote and whose 'Habits & particular 
Interests' are and probably always will be so different."292 
Federalism's capacity to promote local autonomy has also received 
praise from scholars. For example, while national governance imposes a 
uniform rule on the whole that ignores local preferences, governance by 
subnational sovereigns allows for greater tailoring of policies to match local 
circumstances and tastes.293 Several scholars have also emphasized the 
economic efficiency of empowering local governments to match regional 
differences.294 Economist George Stigler acknowledged that "a good 
political system adapts itself to the differing circumstances and mores of 
different localities."295 Other scholars have documented substantial cost 
savings that can flow from allowing local governance to tailor policies and 
administration to fit local needs.296 
Local autonomy also creates opportunities for greater 
experimentation and innovation. As Justice Louis Brandeis famously 
observed, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
291. STORING, supra note 281, at 230. 
292. Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 1787), in 4 
THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 324 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1907). 
293. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and 
Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 775 
(1995); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the 
Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555, 558-59 (1994). 
294. See LeBoeuf, supra note 293, at 558-59 nn.l0-11 (compiling sources 
examining the economic arguments in favor of local governance in a federal system). 
295. George Stigler, Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government, in 
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 85th CONG., 1st SESS., FEDERAL EXPENDITURE POLICY 
FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY: PAPERS SUBMITTED BY PANELISTS 
APPEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISCAL POLICY 213 ( Comm. Print 1957). 
296. Martha Derthick, American Federalism: Madison's Middle Ground in the 
1980s, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 70 (1987); see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON 
TuLLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 135-40 (1962) (using individualized economic cost-benefit analysis to 
explore hypothetical democratic decisionmaking). 
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single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country."297 Whereas national governance is often criticized for stifling 
choice,298 local governance allows regional subunits of the nation to 
develop new methods of solving social problems, delivering social services, 
or administering public resources.299 Local governments may be motivated 
to innovate in response to local preferences and conditions, or they may be 
motivated to compete for economic development or a mobile citizenry 
capable of relocating to jurisdictions that offer a superior environment for 
managing a business or raising a family.300 When new policies are 
implemented on a piecemeal, regional basis, the effects can be evaluated 
and improvements implemented without the broader risks of rolling out a 
massive new policy on a national basis.301 Furthermore, local 
experimentation allows jurisdictions to adopt proven policies adopted 
elsewhere, leading to the diffusion of successful government policies and 
practices. 302 
297. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
298. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 283, at 1498; Philip J. Weiser, Federal 
Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1702 (2001) ("The absence of a federal standard ... can help 
ensure that the regulatory regime does not 'lock in' a suboptimal standard."). 
299. See LeBoeuf, supra note 293, at 561-62. 
300. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416, 418 (1956); see also Calabresi, supra note 293, at 775-77. In Tiebout's 
model of fiscal federalism, citizens "vote with their feet" by moving to jurisdictions that 
provide desirable packages of public goods. RYAN, supra note 33, at 53; see Ilya Somin, 
Closing the Pandora's Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal 
Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 468 (2002) ("[T]he theory of 
interstate competition asserts that states actively compete with each other to attract 
new citizens, who can improve their lot through the power of 'exit' rights. Conversely, 
states also strive to ensure that current residents will not depart for greener pastures 
offered by competitors." (footnote omitted)). The Tiebout model of fiscal federalism 
has been criticized for its assumption that citizens are well-informed and free to move 
between jurisdictions. See RYAN, supra note 35, at 54. It has also been criticized for 
assuming that citizens choose to live in certain communities over others in response to 
public goods and taxes, as many individuals may be more influenced by other factors 
such as family ties or cultural connections to certain areas. See, e.g., id.; Barry 
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317,387-88 (1997). 
301. See RYAN, supra note 35, at 56. 
302. See, e.g., LeBoeuf, supra note 293, at 562-63; G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories 
of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and Scientific Management, PUBLIUS, Winter 
2001, at 37, 42. 
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4. Problem-Solving Capacity 
In his defense of the Constitution's federal system, James Madison 
reminded his cohorts that "the public good, the real welfare of the great 
body of the people, is the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form 
of government whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the 
attainment of this object."303 Madison's statement urged his audience to 
recall that the aim of designing a system of governance was not to protect 
state (or federal) sovereignty for sovereignty's sake, but to identify a 
structure that would provide the best opportunity for solving policy issues 
and protecting the public welfare. 
Consistent with Madison's plea, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has 
called for a focus on federalism as a means to enhance the nation's 
problem-solving potential at each layer of government: 
[F]ederalism should not be a highly formalistic doctrine used to limit 
the ability of government to deal with important problems. Instead, 
federalism should be reconceived as a functional analysis of how to 
best equip each level of government with the authority that it needs to 
respond to the serious problems facing American society.304 
One approach to using federalism to further problem solving is the 
principle of subsidiarity.305 Subsidiarity instructs that we should always 
prefer governance by the lowest level of government with the capacity to 
solve a social problem.306 Although "subsidiarity" is a term more frequently 
associated with the European Union than the United States,307 the concept 
303. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), supra note 56, at 359. 
304. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (2008). 
305. Several scholars state that federalism has been explicitly connected to the 
principle of subsidiarity for nearly 500 years. Albert Breton et a!., Decentralization and 
Subsidiarity: Toward a Theoretical Reconciliation, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 21, 21 n.2 
(1998). 
306. See Findley, supra note 279, at 1092 ("[D]ecisions should default to the 
lowest level possible .... "). 
307. See, e.g., Treaty on European Union and Final Act, art. 3b, Feb. 7, 1992, 
O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992). Article 3b provides the following requirement of subsidiarity: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community 
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in 
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of 
828 Drake Law Review [Vol. 62 
has been described as "the guiding principle of federalism in the United 
States. "308 
In many cases, the problem-solving potential of government is 
enhanced through interjurisdictional cooperation rather than purely local 
or federal governance.309 Since the 1930s, several models of federalism have 
reflected the need for intergovernmental dependence in order to respond 
to systemic, crosscutting issues. Cooperative federalism, for example, was 
first hailed as a critical conceptual break from the dual federalism model of 
separate, independent spheres that the Supreme Court had traditionally 
endorsed.310 Rather than emphasizing federal and state sovereignty as 
existing within segregated, demarcated spheres, cooperative federalism 
emphasized the partnership and joint action potential of the federal-state 
relationship.311 Although more coercive forms of cooperative federalism 
have fallen into disfavor,312 cooperative federalism continues to be 
the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty. 
/d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
308. David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 359, 359 (1998); see also 
Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments in the United States 
Constitution, 52 VILL. L. REV. 67, 95-96 (2007). 
309. See Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION AMONG 
STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 65,65--69 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991). 
310. For cases demonstrating this view, see, for example, Ableman v. Booth, 
62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1858) ("[T]he powers of the General Government, and of 
the State, although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial limits, are 
yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each 
other, within their respective spheres."); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316, 405 (1819) ("Th[e federal] government is acknowledged by all to be one of 
enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, 
would seem too apparent to have required to be enforced by all those arguments which 
its enlightened friends ... found it necessary to urge."); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 
Dallas) 419, 435 (1793) ("The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of 
Government actually surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the 
powers reserved."), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
311. Elazar, supra note 309, at 73-74. 
312. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, § 2(2), 2 U.S.C. 
§§ 1532-1538 (2012). But see Paul Posner, The Politics of Coercive Federalism in the 
Bush Era, 37 PUBLIUS 390, 408 (2007) ("Federal actions constituting coercive 
federalism, including mandates, continue to be a major feature of our system .... "). 
2014] The First Federalists 829 
employed as the most appropriate model of regulatory oversight in many 
fields. In environmental law, for example, cooperative federalism has been 
characterized as "an enduring, organizing concept," allowing for federal 
establishment of national pollution-control standards and environmental 
regulatory programs with state implementation and enforcement.313 
In more recent years, several scholars brought renewed focus to 
federalism's problem-solving capacity using interdependent governance. 
These theoretical perspectives refer to federalism as dynamic,314 
polyphonic,315 dialogic,316 empowering,317 and interactive,318 and they call 
attention to the advantages of shared and overlapping multilevel 
governance. 
Chemerinsky situates effective government as the ultimate aim of 
federalism, and he notes that federalism accomplishes this objective in 
large part by its opportunity for redundancy. He writes: 
A key advantage of having multiple levels of government is the 
availability of alternative actors to solve important problems. If the 
federal government fails to act, state and local government action is 
still possible. If states fail to deal with an issue, federal or local action is 
possible. In other words, a tremendous advantage of federalism is its 
redundancy-multiple levels of government over the same territory 
and population, each with the ability to act. From this perspective, 
federalism needs to be reconceptualized as being primarily about 
empowering varying levels of government and much less about limiting 
government. 319 
Chemerinsky notes that sometimes an all-hands-on-deck approach to 
313. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 187 (2005). 
314. Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in 
Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006). 
315. ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE 
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 92 (2009). 
316. Powell, supra note 15, at 250. 
317. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 
U. KAN. L. REv. 1219, 1221 (1997) ("[F)ederalism should be considered as a way of 
empowering multiple levels of government to deal with social problems and not, as it 
traditionally has been used, as limits on government power."). 
318. Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens's Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2135 (2006). 
319. Chemerinsky, supra note 317, at 1234 (footnote omitted). 
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multilevel governance is required to effectively address social problems.32o 
Environmental protection is one such area, because local governments are 
most likely to have knowledge of relevant conditions and resources, while 
the federal government is in the best position to identify externalities and 
avoid a regulatory race to the bottom.321 At other times, each level of 
government must be empowered to act in the event that the other levels of 
government fail to respond to a pressing need.322 
Robert Schapiro also documents the important role of redundancy in 
intersystemic adjudication. He writes that "[t]he redundancy of state and 
federal court systems provides a significant advantage of judicial federalism 
in the United States. If one system fails in its promise to protect rights, the 
other remains ready to intervene. "323 In addition, Professor Catherine 
Powell augments the case for interactive governance by describing the 
social benefits that flow from allowing multiple layers of government to 
translate and incorporate fundamental norms such as human rights.324 
Powell explains that this form of dialogic federalism allows for greater 
participation, including opportunities for wider deliberation, debate, and 
learning, and it consequently produces a thicker, more complex 
understanding of the law.325 
C. Tribal Governance 
Every day throughout the country, Indian tribes are solving social 
problems by engaging in the diligent, persistent work of governance. The 
effects of this work generate benefits that extend well beyond tribal 
communities to include surrounding regions and the rest of the country as a 
whole. This fact may seem remarkable, given that American Indians 
experience the highest rate of poverty of any race group in the United 
States,326 and their communities have suffered a long legacy of brutal 
320. /d. 
321. See id. 
322. !d. at 1235. 
323. SCHAPIRO, supra note 315, at 122 (footnote omitted). 
324. Powell, supra note 15, at 254. 
325. See id. 
326. SUZANNE MACARTNEY ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY RATES 
FOR SELECTED DETAILED RACE AND HISPANIC GROUPS BY STATE AND PLACE: 2007-
2011, at 1-2 (2013). Between 2007-2011, the poverty rate for individuals identifying as 
American Indian or Alaska Native alone was 27 percent. This figure is almost twice the 
national poverty rate of 14.3 percent. Id. 
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federal policies aimed at their elimination. Professor Laura Evans observes 
that 
with a few notable exceptions as of late, tribal officials often plan and 
execute their political strategies from dilapidated office buildings, on 
meager budgets, amidst populations that struggle against the ravages 
of shockingly low incomes, inadequate housing, and poor health .... 
And yet, we find examples of tribal governments advocating for and 
winning new courses of action by nearby governments.327 
Evans documents the fact that many resource-constrained tribal 
governments have found sustained success developing their policies and 
expertise and influencing other governments along the way.328 In fact, 
examples abound throughout Indian country that illustrate how tribes 
engage in effective governance and promote the core values that undergird 
federalism. 
1. Checks and Balances 
Indian tribes have long relied on their governing institutions as a 
critical defense against actual tyranny. Beginning with the founding of the 
United States and continuing through much of the nation's history, the 
states and their inhabitants have engaged in open and frequently bloody 
conflicts with Indian tribes.329 Centralized federal power in Indian affairs 
through the Indian Commerce Clause in the Constitution and the Trade 
and Intercourse Act arose from the federalists' early recognition of state 
demand for Indian lands and resources. 330 
The events that led to the Cherokee cases of the Marshall Trilogy also 
demonstrate fierce state willingness to engage in acts of tyranny and abuse 
toward tribes. Georgia's peremptory hanging of Corn Tassel, its passage of 
the Cherokee Codes, and its attempt to drive out the Cherokee from their 
homeland were extreme acts of violence and hostility toward the Indians.331 
In Worcester, Marshall responded by affirming Indian treaty rights and 
rights of self-government as a check against state abuse.332 By affirming the 
327. EVANS, supra note 252, at 4. 
328. See id. at 158-59. 
329. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 68, 
§ 1.03[2]-[4), at 30-55 (chronicling early battles and conflicts). 
330. See id. §§ 1.02[3], 1.03[2), at 22-23, 35-36. 
331. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. 
332. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 561 (1832), abrogation 
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tribe's retained inherent sovereignty and the exclusion of state jurisdiction, 
the opinion established a legal safeguard against Georgia's tyrannical use 
of state power. 
During the 20th century, Congress continued to be mindful of the 
potential for state abuse of power in relations with tribes. In the area of 
child welfare, Congress specifically strengthened tribal self-governance to 
help Indian communities address a long history of widespread removal of 
children from Indian families by state social services. The Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), for example, affirms that tribal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over all child custody proceedings involving Indian 
children domiciled in Indian country.333 The ICWA also affirms that tribal 
courts have presumptive but concurrent jurisdiction over all other Indian 
child custody cases, and it incorporates additional procedural protections 
to minimize the potential for continued state abuse.334 
In response to the continuing child welfare crisis, tribal courts around 
the country are strengthening their capacity to exercise jurisdiction over 
child welfare matters.335 However, not all tribes have this capacity. One 
such example is the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians.336 The Maliseet 
received federal recognition in 1980, and its powers of self-government 
were restricted under the terms of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement 
Act.337 The tribe used institution-building and other forms of governance to 
address the state's historic lack of compliance with the ICW A.338 Prior to 
the Houlton Band's actions, the state ignored the ICWA's requirements, 
and until the late 1990s, state child protective services had conducted 
recognized by Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
333. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012). 
334. Id. § 1911(b). Additional procedural protections include a tribe's right to 
intervene in state court proceedings and a requirement that each state give full faith 
and credit to tribal acts, records, and proceedings involving child custody. Id. 
§ 1911(c)-(d). 
335. See Lorie M. Graham, "The Past Never Vanishes": A Contextual Critique 
of the Existing Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 50-51 (1998). 
336. The Maliseet Nation are "river people" who live alongside the St. John 
River and its tributaries in Maine and New Brunswick. Information about the Nation 
can be found at About Us, HOULTON BAND OF MALISEET INDIANS, 
http://www.maliseets.com/index.htm (last visited June 15, 2014). 
337. See Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1725(a), 1727(e). 
338. See HARVARD PROJECf ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., supra note 3, at 1-
2. 
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continual surveillance of Maliseet families.339 As a result of the state's 
actions, at least 16 percent of all Maliseet children lived in out-of-home 
placements in 1999.340 To address this abuse, the Maliseet formed a 
Department of Indian Child Welfare Services, adopted strict regulations 
governing child welfare matters, and formed an intergovernmental 
collaboration with the State of Maine.341 The tribe's effort gained the state's 
respect and triggered important changes in state practices.342 By 2006, the 
percentage of Maliseet children placed outside the home had been cut in 
half.343 
In a matter that continues to develop, several South Dakota tribes are 
responding to alleged state abuses in child welfare proceedings.344 In March 
2013, the Oglala Sioux Tribe, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, and the American 
Civil Liberties Union filed a class action lawsuit against the State of South 
Dakota demanding compliance with the ICWA.345 The complaint alleges 
that the State of South Dakota removes scores of Indian children from 
their homes based on insufficient evidence and in perfunctory and 
inadequate hearings in violation of the ICWA.346 Since the case was filed, 
nine South Dakota tribes collaborated to create an independent, tribal 
foster care program using direct federal funding.347 
2. Democratic Participation and Accountability 
In many cases, tribal governance affords extensive opportunities for 
democratic participation that eclipse opportunities in state and federal 
governments. Tribal communities are engaged in direct, local government 
administration, but their work extends far beyond the municipal 
governance in many of their neighboring jurisdictions. 
339. !d. 
340. Id. at 3. 
341. Id. at 1. 
342. Id. at 2. 
343. Id. at 3. 
344. See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2-3, 
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, Civ. No. 13-5020 (D.S.D. Mar. 21, 2013), 2013 WL 
1178660. 
345. /d. at 38-39. 
346. /d. at 3. 
347. South Dakota Tribal Leaders Seek Federal Foster Care Help, RAPID CITY 
J. (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/south-dakota-tribal-
leaders-seek-federal-foster-care-help/ article _8562cb 15-4d3e-52da -8546-16c76a53e952. 
html. 
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As separate sovereigns, tribes exercise independent control over 
developing the essential constitutive aspects of their governments. Many 
tribal communities, for example, have engaged in lengthy and detailed 
negotiation over adopting or amending tribal constitutions.348 These 
deliberations require deep engagement by the entire community in the 
most basic yet fundamental issues of governance, such as the definition of 
membership,349 the structure of government, separation of powers, the 
lawmaking powers of the legislature, and the development of a judiciary or 
other forum for deciding disputes.350 In many cases, tribal communities 
have created unique interpretations of the function and significance of 
these aspects of governance, indicating that the community has participated 
in translating legal norms into cultural terms that reflect indigenous 
perspectives. 351 
Independent tribal sovereignty also means that tribes are engaged in 
administering complex governmental structures, laws, and programs. In 
some cases, members of tribal communities also participate in general 
councils in which the entire adult membership of the tribe deliberates and 
decides all important matters.352 
Tribal communities must also navigate intergovernmental relations 
with multiple levels of government. In contrast to non-Indian local 
governments, tribes manage direct relationships with local, state, and 
348. See generally Eric Lemont, Developing Effective Processes of American 
Indian Constitutional and Governmental Reform: Lessons from the Cherokee Nation of 
Oklahoma, Hualapai Nation, Navajo Nation, and Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 26 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 147 (2002) (discussing the large-scale governmental and constitutional 
reforms of the four nations). 
349. See generally KIRSTY GOVER, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: STATES, 
TRIBES, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF MEMBERSHIP 108-34 (2010) (analyzing the varying 
definitions and criteria used to determine membership). 
350. GERALD VIZENOR & JILL DOERFLER, THE WHITE EARTH NATION: 
RATIFICATION OF A NATIVE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 28 (2012); see Eric D. 
Lemont, Introduction, AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE 
REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 1, 2 (Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006); COHEN, supra note 
189,at28-32,55-75. 
351. See Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-
Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 492-98 (2000). See generally THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT 
FORTY (Kristen A. Carpenter et al., eds. 2012) (including chapters on tribal 
interpretations of equal protection, due process, and freedom of speech and religion). 
352. See, e.g., Stands Over Bull v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 442 F. Supp. 360, 
369 (D. Mont. 1977). 
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federal officers and agencies. Tribes also participate in extensive intertribal 
relations,353 and many tribal communities participate directly before 
international bodies that play a role in protecting indigenous rights.354 
These opportunities for intergovernmental engagement create an enhanced 
version of civic engagement in tribal communities. 
The channels for civic engagement in tribal governance provide 
critical opportunities to influence policy that are largely absent at the state 
and federal level. Tribal members comprise a small fraction of the 
electorate in the federal government and nearly all states.355 Their small 
numbers result in very limited opportunities to wield power and experience 
the responsibility that accompanies being in the majority. As a result, tribal 
preferences and positions are more likely to be marginalized by dissenters, 
and the perception of futility is more likely to cause withdrawal from 
political life.356 In addition, the power to govern provides individuals with 
important experience with the need to compromise, negotiate, and take 
stock of the potentially oppressive impact that one's preferences can have 
on minorities. Each of these experiences is critical for developing true 
"civic virtue" in society. Finally, when tribal communities are empowered 
to use their own processes for civic engagement to decide matters, their 
positions can be translated to laws and institutions, putting their 
perspectives on a stronger footing to enrich the nation's political dialogue. 
While tribal members enjoy rich opportunities for civic engagement, 
tribal governance has been accused of leaving no space for democratic 
participation by nonmembers.357 The exercise of jurisdiction over these 
353. See Steven J. Gunn, Compacts, Confederacies, and Comity: Intertribal 
Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders, 34 N.M. L. Rev. 297, 325-34 (2004) (identifying 
several examples). 
354. See generally Robert T. Coulter, Using International Human Rights 
Mechanisms to Promote and Protect Rights of Indian Nations and Tribes in the United 
States: An Overview, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 573 (2007). 
355. See 2012 American Community Survey, ACS Demographic and Housing 
Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/ 
pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_12_1 YR_DP05&prodType=table (last visited June 
15, 2014). 
356. See McCool, supra note 169, at 129 (noting tribal votes can affect 
elections significantly, but only "if two conditions are met"-the race is close and the 
tribal members vote as a bloc). 
357. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (noting that "[t]he Constitution is based on a theory of original, and 
continuing, consent of the governed" and that tribal criminal jurisdiction over a 
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nonmembers is frequently called the "democracy deficit."358 Many scholars 
have discounted the democracy deficit by analogizing tribal jurisdiction 
over nonmembers to state jurisdiction over nonresidents who visit the 
state.359 Yet, an important distinction exists when tribes assert jurisdiction 
over nonmembers who reside within Indian country. 
Unlike the freedom individuals enjoy to establish residency in a new 
state and acquire state citizenship, nonmembers who live within Indian 
country acquire no citizenship rights in the tribe.360 This issue requires 
more extensive room for engagement than this Article provides. However, 
several ameliorating factors require consideration. 
First, federal and state governance also reflect a democracy deficit 
due to the development of the common law by unelected judges,361 the 
increasing amount of decisionmaking that is shunted to government 
bureaucrats rather than elected officials,362 and the disenfranchisement of 
citizens who are unable to overcome voting laws that restrict access to the 
polls.363 The deficit exists in many areas of society, and tribal governance 
nonmember Indian contradicts that principle); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679, 694 
(1990) (noting that a nonmember Indian criminal defendant who appealed a tribal 
court's assertion of jurisdiction over him was not eligible for membership in the tribe 
that attempted to prosecute him and was therefore unable to vote in tribal elections, 
hold tribal office, or serve on tribal juries), superseded by statute, Act of Oct. 28, 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-137, § 1, 105 Stat. 646. 
358. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 115 (2002); accord Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 
11 (2012-2013). 
359. See, e.g., ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE 
NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 566 (rev. 4th ed. 2003); 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal and Intratribal Common Law, 
43 Hous. L. REV. 701,712-13 (2006). 
360. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 358, at 116. 
361. Cf Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L 
L. 1, 103 (2006). 
362. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 1107-08 (3d ed. 2003) 
(arguing that elected officials frequently delegate powers of standard creation to 
agencies); Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New 
Framework to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 
849-50 (1997). 
363. See Jamin Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment for the U.S. Constitution: 
Confronting America's Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 ELECTION L.J. 559, 564-70 
(2004). 
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represents just one place along the continuum of this issue. 
Second, federal and state governance over tribes represents a 
significant countervailing democracy deficit. Indian tribes never consented 
to their incorporation within the United States, and they never consented 
to the Constitution or congressional plenary power in Indian affairs.364 
Because many lacked citizenship until the Citizenship Act of 1924, many 
tribal citizens also lacked the right to vote in elections throughout much of 
Congress's history of passing legislation to remove and assimilate tribes.365 
Similarly, tribes have not consented to the exercise of state jurisdiction 
within their boundaries, and state elected officials have no political 
incentive to be accountable to small populations of tribal citizens.366 
Third, tribal communities can mitigate the effects of the democracy 
deficit by respecting democratic values such as due process, transparency, 
and equal protection in the formation and enforcement of law.367 
Fourth, tribal communities can address the democracy deficit by 
disaggregating the rights that are typically bundled with citizenship and 
allowing nonmembers to participate in forms of governance that relate to 
tribal jurisdiction over them.368 
3. Local Autonomy 
Federalism has long been celebrated for its capacity to protect 
diversity.369 In Gregory, the Supreme Court noted that federalism "assures 
a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs 
of a heterogenous [sic] society."370 In addition, scholars have credited 
federalism with easing conflicts along racial, ethnic, and ideological lines by 
allowing individual groups to enjoy the freedom to exercise decisionmaking 
power in regional subunits of the nation.371 When culturally diverse groups 
364. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998). 
365. See McCool, supra note 169, at 106-07. 
366. Richard B. Collins, Never Construed to Their Prejudice: In Honor of 
David Getches, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (2013). 
367. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
368. See generally Cristina M. Rodriguez, Noncitizen Voting and the 
Extraconstitutional Construction of the Polity, 8 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 30,30-31 (2010). 
369. Somin, supra note 300, at 464. 
370. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
371. Somin, supra note 300, at 465; see also DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC 
GROUPS IN CONFLICT 601-28 (1985) (discussing how innovations in federalism, 
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exercise authority in smaller subnational sovereigns, they also contribute to 
the nation's pluralism, allowing ideological differences to be channeled into 
distinct policies and creating a richer national dialogue as a result.372 
Whereas state-level governance has trended toward increasing 
homogeneity due to the diffusion of minority interests and the ubiquity of 
modern consumer culture,373 tribal governance represents authentic 
pluralism. The 566 federally recognized tribes in the United States374 
represent approximately 175 living languages375 and tremendous cultural 
and religious distinctiveness as well. This cultural diversity supports a wide 
variety of institutional and policy diversity within tribal governance.376 
Furthermore, many tribes are committed to responding to the history of 
federal policies aimed at forced assimilation by revitalizing tribal 
customary law and developing their legal systems to reflect traditional 
teachings and values.377 In addition to the cultural and social incentives for 
tribal governance and cultural alignment, tribes also have economic 
incentives. Professors Joe Kalt and Stephen Cornell have documented that 
the odds of success for tribal development increase when there is a 
"cultural match" between the culture of a tribe and the formal institutions 
of governance.378 
Tribal governance also produces a variety of innovations that 
command national recognition and emulation. Harvard University's Ash 
regional autonomy, and electoral systems have had an impact on ethnic conflict). 
372. See A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need 
for a Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789, 795 (1985). 
373. Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power 
and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 558 (1995). See 
generally SCHAPIRO, supra note 315, at 16-30. 
374. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the 
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 78 Fed. Reg. 26384 (May 6, 2013), available at 
http://www. bia.gov /cs/ grou ps/xofa/documen ts/text/idc1-022514. pdf. 
375. Allison M. Dussias, Indigenous Languages Under Siege: The Native 
American Experience, 3 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 5, 6-7 (2008). 
376. See Duane Champagne, Remaking Tribal Constitutions, in AMERICAN 
INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE REBUILDING OF NATIVE NATIONS 12 
(Eric D. Lemont ed., 2006); Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to 
American Indian Economic Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597,610-11 (2004). 
377. See AUSTIN, supra note 21, at xix. 
378. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the 
Chances for Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN 
TRIBES Do? STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 16-18 (Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992). 
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Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation identifies government 
programs that demonstrate excellence on the basis of four criteria: novelty, 
effectiveness, significance, and transferability to other jurisdictions.379 Fifty-
one tribal programs have been recognized since the creation of the award 
in 1986,380 representing a sizable proportion of the program's total number 
of more than 300 awardees.381 One example is the Yukon River Inter-
Tribal Watershed Council in Fairbanks, Alaska. The Yukon River Council 
brings together 70 tribes and First Nations in the United States and Canada 
to protect the Yukon River watershed.382 In 2013, the Ash Center 
commended the council for "navigating complex jurisdictional challenges, 
historical conflict, and diverse partnerships with government agencies, 
private industries, research institutions, and communities."383 
Former Attorney General Janet Reno and Justice O'Connor also 
identified tribal governing institutions as sources of innovation that may 
benefit non-Indian jurisdictions. Both Reno384 and O'Connor385 focused on 
the potential use of tribal peacemaking techniques and their general 
principles in state and federal legal systems. Justice O'Connor observed 
that "[t]he Indian tribal courts' development of further methods of dispute 
resolution will provide a model from which the Federal and State courts 
can benefit as they seek to encompass alternatives to the Anglo-American 
adversarial model."386 The Center for Court Innovation has responded to 
379. Innovations in American Government Awards Selection Criteria, ASH 
CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE & INNOVATION, http://www.ash.har 
vard .edu/ash/Home/Programs/1 nnova tions-in -Government/ A wards/Selection Criteria. 
380. Award Winners from Tribal Governments, ASH CENTER FOR 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE & INNOVATION, available at http://www.innovations. 
harvard.edu/award_landing.html?year=&dloc=&iloc=Tribal+Governments&top=&viw 
Awards=View+Awards (last visited June 15, 2014). 
381. About Us, ASH CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE & 
INNOVATION, www.innovations.harvard.edu/about-us.html (last visited June 15, 2014). 
382. About Us, YUKON RIVER INTER-TRIBAL WATERSHED COUNCIL, http:// 
www.yritwc.org/About-Us/About-Us.aspx (last visited June 15, 2014). 
383. Press Release, Ash Center, Top 25 Programs: In Detail (May 1, 2013), 
available at http://www .ash.harvard.edu/Home/News-Events/Press-Releases/Innovatio 
ns/Top-25-Innovations-in -Government-Announced2fT op-25-Programs. 
384. See Carole E. Goldberg, Overextended Borrowing: Tribal Peacemaking 
Applied in Non-Indian Disputes, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1003, 1006 (1997) (reproducing 
remarks Reno made at an Indian Crime Forum in 1997). 
385. Sandra Day O'Connor, Remarks, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: 
Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TuLSA L.J. 1, 6 (1997). 
386. . /d. But see Goldberg, supra note 384, at 1019 (suggesting it is difficult "to 
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the interest in exploring tribal justice system innovations and their 
potential for export into other jurisdictions by forming a project called the 
Tribal Justice Exchange.387 The project highlights and shares information 
about the "best practices developed in Indian Country that could help 
strengthen public safety initiatives elsewhere in the United States."388 
Several non-Indian jurisdictions have already adapted Indian peacemaking 
and related principles of restorative justice with remarkable success.389 
An additional critical aspect of federalism's local autonomy value is 
the freedom of subnational sovereigns to tailor local policies to match local 
conditions. In Indian affairs, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) has long been criticized as the poster child for the 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency of centralized national control.39° Federal 
policymakers from the Indian New Deal era and the New Federalism era of 
the latter 20th century supported empowering Indian control and 
governance as an antidote to federal mismanagement, paternalism, and 
wastefulness. 391 
Tribal governance and response to social problems has allowed 
Native leaders to apply their knowledge of local context to produce policies 
graft [tribal dispute resolution mechanisms] onto the secular, heterogeneous, 
individualistic non-Indian justice system"). 
387. Tribal Justice, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION, http://www.court 
innovation.org/topic/tribal-justice (last visited June 15, 2014). 
388. Training & Technical Assistance: Center for Court Innovation, U.S. DEP'T 
OF JUST., http:l/www.justice.gov/tribaVtta-cci.html (last visited June 15, 2014). 
389. Since adapting peacemaking to county needs for juvenile offenders and 
child neglect and abuse cases, Yellow Medicine County, Minnesota, has experienced "a 
91 percent reduction in out-of-home placement expenses." CTR. FOR COURT 
INNOVATION, WIDENING THE CIRCLE: CAN PEACEMAKING WORK OUTSIDE OF TRIBAL 
COMMUNITIES? 11 (2012), available at http:l/www.courtinnovation.org/sites/de 
fault/files/documents/Widening_Circle.pdf. See generally YELLOW MEDICINE COUNTY 
CIRCLE SENTENCING PROGRAM HANDBOOK (2013), available at http:l/www. 
co. ym.mn.gov/verticaVsites/% 7B9E2CF57F-OFF6-475F-BEOEE5C421454DD B% 7D/u 
ploads!HANDBOOKcircle_setence.pdf. 
390. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo & Michael J. Meagher, Broken Promises: 
The Failure of the 1920's Native American Irrigation and Assimilation Policies, 19 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 1, 36 (1997); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Looking to the East: The Stories of 
Modern Indian People and the Development of Tribal Law, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. 
JUST. 1, 14 (2006) (calling BIA oversight a "bureaucratic nightmare"). 
391. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 66, at 
vii-viii (describing Felix Cohen as "a leading advocate of tribal self-government"); id. 
§ 1.07 (tracing the era of self-determination and self-government starting in the 1960s). 
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that are often more successful than centralized management under federal 
control. Tribal government responses to climate change powerfully 
illustrate this point. Tribal communities have profound knowledge about 
the lands and resources of their territories. In many cases, tribal 
communities have occupied their present territories for thousands of years, 
and indigenous knowledge about the environment is passed on from 
generation to generation.392 This deep familiarity creates a repository of 
local expertise that informs tribal policies and the work of government 
institutions. In addition, many tribal communities are located in 
environmentally sensitive areas that are the first to experience, record, and 
communicate the impacts of global climate change. 
The Swinomish Tribe in Washington is one example of how tribes 
have taken a national leadership role in response to climate change. In 
2007, the tribe adopted a Climate Change Proclamation that directed the 
tribal government and its departments "[t]o undertake efforts as possible 
to determine the potential local effects of climate change . . . including 
effects and projected impacts on the local environment, forestry resources, 
agriculture, fish and wildlife, water resources, and shorelines, as well as 
critical infrastructure and public health."393 The proclamation also directed 
the tribal government to develop appropriate policies and strategies for 
addressing these impacts, including measures that would reduce the tribe's 
contribution to the causes of climate change.394 In 2008, the tribe began a 
two-year project to identify both climate change impacts and appropriate 
responses; in 2009 it released an impact report, and in 2010 it completed a 
climate-change action plan.395 The tribe is currently in the process of 
implementing the various measures identified in its action plan, including 
392. See Nicholas J. Reo, Editorial, The Importance of Belief Systems in 
Traditional Ecological Knowledge Initiatives, 2 INT'L INDIGENOUS POL'Y J., no. 4, 2011, 
art. 8, at 1, available at http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss4/8. 
393. Proclamation of the Swinomish Indian Senate on a Swinomish Climate 
Change Initiative, SWINOMISH INDIAN SENATE (Oct. 2, 2007), http://www.swinomish-n 
sn.gov/climate_change/Docs/Swinomish %20Climate %20Change %20Proclamation. pdf. 
394. Id. 
395. Terri Hansen, 8 Tribes That Are Way Ahead of the Climate-Adaptation 
Curve, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Oct. 15, 2013), http:// 
indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/10/15/8-tribes-are-way-ahead-climate-ada 
ptation-curve-151763. For the 2010 plan, see generally SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL 
CMTY., SWINOMISH CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE CLIMATE ADAPTATION ACTION 
PLAN (2010), available at http://www.swinomish.org/climate_change/Docs/SITC_CC_ 
AdaptationActionPlan_complete.pdf. 
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the adoption of new tribal codes, the establishment of coastal protection 
measures, the assessment of community health impacts, and an evaluation 
of climate-change-induced wildfire risks and available responses.396 
4. Problem-Solving Capacity 
Tribal governance also demonstrates the problem-solving capacity 
that federalism values. Tribal governance embodies the principle of 
subsidiarity, which counsels deference to the most local unit of government 
with the capacity to respond to social problems.397 When tribal self-
governance and autonomy were strengthened during the eras of the Indian 
New Deal and Indian self-determination, federal policymakers were 
strongly influenced by this principle. Collier and Cohen supported tribal 
governance as a superior alternative to the wastefulness and 
mismanagement of past federal approaches to Indian affairs.398 Similarly, 
President Nixon and his aides professed commitment to Indian self-
determination as part of a national effort to limit the "bureaucratic 
monstrosity" of ineffective federal centralized power and return power to 
the people.399 
Tribal initiatives that establish intergovernmental cooperation also 
demonstrate federalism's value of pragmatic problem solving. Several 
scholars have documented the need for tribal participation in 
intergovernmental agreements.400 Due to gaps in tribal jurisdiction and the 
need to pool expertise and resources to respond to difficult social 
problems, tribal governments are intimately familiar with the critical role 
of intergovernmental cooperation. Intergovernmental agreements between 
396. Hansen, supra note 395. 
397. See Currie, supra note 308, at 359. 
398. See supra notes 184-186 and accompanying text. 
399. See RICHARD NIXON, PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE 
AMERICAN INDIANS-MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, H. DOC. NO. 91-363, 116 
CONG. REc. 23258 (1970) (announcing national repudiation of the termination policy 
and supporting Indian self-determination); Richard Nixon, President of the United 
States, Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs (Aug. 8, 1969), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2191 (announcing New Federalism as a means 
of limiting federal government waste and returning power to the people). 
400. See, e.g., David H. Getches, Negotiated Sovereignty: Intergovernmental 
Agreements with American Indian Tribes as Models for Expanding Self-Government, 1 
REV. CONST. STUD. 120 (1993); Pommersheim, supra note 261, at 264-67; Note, 
Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 922 (1999). 
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tribes and other tribal, local, state, and federal governments exist in nearly 
every area of governance, including environmental protection, natural 
resources management, law enforcement, criminal justice, child welfare, 
taxation, and land use planning.40l 
Tribal participation in intergovernmental agreements represents what 
some scholars have termed "picket fence" federalism, in which the 
horizontal slats of a fence represent federal, state, tribal, and local 
governments and the vertical posts represent clusters of agency expertise 
on specific issues.402 Many have observed that the intergovernmental 
approach to problem solving represents the most important area of growth 
for government innovation.403 
The intergovernmental problem-solving capacity of cooperative 
federalism is also reflected by the role tribes play as primary regulators 
under federal environmental statutes. Just as states exercise primary 
regulatory authority under federal environmental laws, so too do tribes. 
Federal statutes such as the Clean Water Act,404 the Clean Air Act,405 and 
the Safe Drinking Water Act406 explicitly recognize the potential for tribal 
primacy when specific conditions are met. 
Tribal governments also serve the important role of offering 
redundant means of protecting rights, promulgating policy, and serving the 
public within Indian communities.407 This "double security" is crucial, 
401. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 
66, § 6.05, at 589; Tassie Hanna et a!., The Commission on State- Tribal Relations: 
Enduring Lessons in the Modern State-Tribal Relationship, 47 TuLSA L. REv. 553, 557 
(2012). 
402. Gluck, supra note 19, at 570-71; See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh 
Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2001) 
(describing picket fence federalism as a structure in which "state and federal agency 
experts within the same specialty-the 'posts' in the 'fence'--often share more in 
common with each other than they do with the level of government by which they are 
employed"); see also DANIEL]. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE 
STATES 51-54 (3d ed. 1984) (discussing federal-state cooperation in particular discrete 
areas); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES 75-80 (1966). 
403. See, e.g., Adelman & Engel, supra note 10, at 1798-99; Gluck, supra note 





Clean Water Act§ 506, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2012). 
Clean Air Act§ 107, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2012). 
Safe Drinking Water Act§ 302, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (2012). 
Cf Chemerinsky, supra note 317, at 1234. 
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particularly because federal and state governments frequently fail to 
maintain public infrastructure and support government services within 
Indian country when they share overlapping jurisdiction.408 For example, 
on many Indian reservations, states fail to allocate sufficient funds to 
maintain public infrastructure such as schools, roads, water supply, and 
sewage systems.409 Whether due to benign neglect or intentional 
discrimination, this failure is best addressed when tribal governments are 
empowered to raise funds, regulate, and administer the needs of tribal 
communities. 
Tribal courts also further the federalism value of redundancy by 
offering forums for adjudicating claims that arise within Indian country. 
State courts with jurisdiction over disputes involving nonmembers on the 
reservation may be located far from the parties, may present procedural or 
substantive barriers to litigation, may be ignorant of relevant tribal customs 
and practices, or may be tinged with bias as a result of years of animosity 
and hostility toward Indians. In each of these circumstances, tribal courts 
offer an important double security to ensure access to justice. 
The Supreme Court has observed that "the Federal Government has 
consistently encouraged [tribal court] development."410 Recent examples of 
congressional legislation that have supported tribal court development 
include the Indian Tribal Justice Act411 and the Indian Tribal Justice 
Technical and Legal Assistance Act.412 In enacting the Indian Tribal Justice 
Act, Congress acknowledged that "tribal justice systems are an essential 
part of tribal governments and serve as important forums for ensuring 
public health and safety and the political integrity of tribal governments. "413 
As a result of the commitment of tribal leaders and congressional support, 
tribal courts have greatly expanded their capacities throughout the nation. 
408. See DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE GOLDBERG, CAPTURED JUSTICE: 
NATIVE NATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 280, at 73-81, 135 (2012) (describing inadequate 
state law enforcement services within Indian country). 
409. See Brief for Amici Curiae National Intertribal Tax Alliance et al. at 13, 
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (No. 04-631) 
(discussing the public-infrastructure deficit within the Navajo Nation and using roads 
as one example). 
410. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-15 (1987). 
411. Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (1993) 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631). 
412. Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3682). 
413. Indian Tribal Justice Act § 2(5). 
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IV. THEROLEOFTHECOURTS 
The Supreme Court rarely recognizes tribal contributions to effective 
governance within the nation's federal system. Frequently, the 
characteristics of governance that are celebrated as promoting federalism's 
values in the federal-state context are neglected or even portrayed as 
disadvantages in the tribal context. This trend has coincided with a series of 
Supreme Court opinions since 1978 that have narrowly construed tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers and that have permitted increasing state 
authority within Indian country. The following section traces the Court's 
modern role in deciding tribal jurisdiction disputes. It begins with the 
implicit divestiture doctrine in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe414 and 
explores the Montana v. United States test-for tribal civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers415-and its progeny.416 These cases are presented as an 
introduction to the Supreme Court's widespread practice of denigrating or 
neglecting federalism's values in the tribal context. Additional examples 
exist in other doctrinal contexts, including in the Indian preemption cases 
that address state authority within Indian country, but a comprehensive 
discussion of this topic is beyond the space available for this Article.417 
The following discussion highlights the many instances in which the 
Supreme Court has denigrated or ignored the ways in which tribal 
governance promotes federalism's values within the context of the implicit 
divestiture doctrine. 
A. Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country 
The Supreme Court introduced the implicit divestiture doctrine in 
Oliphant when it concluded that tribal governments lack criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers on the reservation.418 This outcome 
abrogated the earlier foundational principle emphasized in Cohen's 
Handbook and in Solicitor Nathan Margold's opinion that tribal powers 
remain extant unless they are diminished by treaty or an act of Congress.419 
414. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). 
415. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
416. See generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy 
in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 391, 397-409 (2007-2008) (presenting 





For an overview of Indian preemption, see generally id. at 416-20. 
See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208. 
Nathan R. Margold, Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14, 65 
846 Drake Law Review [Vol. 62 
The Suquamish Indian Tribe had not entered into a treaty relinquishing its 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, and Congress had not enacted any 
law imposing a limit.420 But Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the 
Court, justified the lack of jurisdiction by relying upon the idea of implicit 
divestiture: "[T]he tribes' retained powers are not such that they are 
limited only by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional 
enactments. . . . Indian tribes are [also] prohibited from exercising both 
those powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by 
Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with their status."'421 Rehnquist 
also emphasized that tribal incorporation into the political system 
corresponds to a diminishment in tribal powers. The opinion stated, "Upon 
incorporation into the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes 
thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and 
their exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict with the 
interests of this overriding sovereignty."422 According to Rehnquist, the 
United States has long "manifested an equally great solicitude that its 
citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions on 
their personalliberty."423 
In his analysis, Justice Rehnquist invoked the reasoning of Ex parte 
Crow Dog,424 which rejected federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians on 
the reservation prior to the enactment of the Major Crimes Act.425 The 
Crow Dog opinion decried the unfairness of subjecting tribal citizens to 
federal criminal laws, which were cast as emanating from another "race 
[and] tradition" and imposing "the restraints of an external and unknown 
code."426 By analogizing Oliphant to Crow Dog, Justice Rehnquist cast 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians as similarly unfair because of 
their connection to another "race [and] tradition" and because of their 
(1934). ("[U]nder Section 16 of the Wheeler-Howard Act, the 'powers vested in any 
Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law', are those powers of local self-government 
which have never been terminated by law or waived by treaty." (citation omitted)); see 
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 66, § 4.01[1 ][a], at 207--08. 
420. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208. 
421. Id. (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
422. ld. at 209. 
423. !d. at 210. 
424. Id. 
425. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883), superseded by statute, 
Indian Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362 (1885). 
426. ld. at 571. 
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"unknown" nature.427 Thereby, from the Supreme Court's perspective, 
tribal jurisdiction must be construed narrowly to avoid subjecting non-
Indians to tribal foreignness and cultural distinctiveness. 
The Court's denigration of tribal difference as unfair and unknowable 
contrasts sharply with federalism's values, which promote diversity and 
local autonomy to enact laws that differ from the national norm. Rather 
than celebrate the Suquamish Tribe for enriching the nation's pluralism 
through the establishment and enforcement of its own criminal justice 
system, the Court reacts in an extreme fashion by introducing the implicit 
divestiture doctrine and altering a foundational principle of Indian law. 
Since Oliphant, the implicit divestiture doctrine has provided grounds 
for decisions limiting tribal civil as well as criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers.428 
The Supreme Court's decisions on tribal criminal jurisdiction also 
triggered an extended tug of war between the judicial and legislative 
branches. In a 1990 case, Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court concluded that 
Oliphant's rule also covered crimes committed by nonmember Indians.429 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy also called attention to the 
potential dangerousness of tribal difference. He noted, 
The special nature of the tribunals at issue makes a focus on consent 
and the protections of citizenship most appropriate. While modem 
tribal courts include many familiar features of the judicial process, they 
are influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the 
tribes they serve. Tribal courts are often "subordinate to the political 
branches of tribal governments," and their legal methods may depend 
on "unspoken practices and norms. "430 
Thus, while federalism is rooted in the belief that a primary goal of 
the structure of government in the United States is to allow distinct 
customs and local usages to flourish within subnational sovereigns, 
distinctiveness in the tribal context is a priori harmful. Justice Kennedy's 
427. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211. 
428. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (deciding a 
tribe had implicitly divested its civil regulatory jurisdiction for hunting and fishing). 
429. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990), superseded by statute, Act of 
Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, § 1, 105 Stat. 646. 
430. !d. at 693 (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW334-335 (1982ed.)). 
848 Drake Law Review [Vol. 62 
opinion does not describe any specific tribal custom, usage, or norm that 
supports his cautionary approach to tribal difference. Instead, he tellingly 
posits difference as a vague, nonspecific concept that is dangerous on its 
face. 
In addition to neglecting the values of diversity, cultural pluralism, 
and local autonomy to respond to local differences, the Oliphant and Duro 
opinions neglect the crucial problem-solving value of federalism. 
Federalism promotes effective problem solving, in part, by providing an 
extra layer of governance that stands ready to protect society's welfare. In 
cases like Oliphant and Duro, tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
and nonmember Indians is essential to protecting reservation communities 
against criminal behavior. The combined effect of the Oliphant decision, 
the Indian Country Crimes Act,431 and the Assimilative Crimes Act432 was 
to place non-Indians who commit crimes against Indian victims under 
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, a high rate of federal 
prosecutorial declination has contributed to an environment in which 
crimes such as sexual assaults against Native women frequently occur 
without any response.433 
Within the same year that the Duro decision was issued, Congress 
responded by enacting legislation clarifying that tribal powers of self-
government specifically include "the inherent power of Indian tribes ... to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."434 Doubts regarding 
Congress's authority to ratchet up its recognition of tribal sovereign powers 
beyond the Supreme Court's interpretation were resolved in 2004, when 
the Supreme Court affirmed the lawfulness of the Duro fix in United States 
v. Lara.435 In its opinion, the Court held that Congress possessed "the 
constitutional power to relax restrictions that the political branches have, 
over time, placed on the exercise of a tribe's inherent legal authority."436 
431. Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
432. Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012). 
433. See AMNESTY INT'L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE F AlLURE TO PROTECT 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 42 (2007), available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/MazeOflnjustice.pdf. 
434. Act of Nov. 5,1990, Pub. L. No.101-511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856,1892-
93 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)). 
435. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004). 
436. /d. at 196. 
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B. Civil Jurisdiction in Indian Country 
In Montana, the Supreme Court extended the implicit divestiture 
doctrine to the civil context.437 The case involved the Crow Nation's 
attempt to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on non-Indian 
owned fee lands within the reservation.438 In its opinion, the Court 
announced that "the principles on which [Oliphant] relied support the 
general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe 
do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."439 The Court 
acknowledged, however, that earlier precedents had affirmed tribal civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers in a variety of cases. It reconciled these cases 
with Montana's general proposition by characterizing them as limited 
exceptions to the rule: 
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise 
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, 
even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, 
licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter 
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe 
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the 
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that 
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, 
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.440 
The Court concluded that the Crow Nation's regulation failed to fit 
under either exception to the general prohibition.441 The non-Indian 
hunters to whom the law applied had not entered into any agreements with 
the tribe or its members.442 The Court also concluded that their activity did 
not threaten the tribe's political integrity, economic security, health, or 
welfare because it found no evidence that the non-Indian's hunting and 
fishing on fee lands would "imperil the subsistence or welfare of the 
Tribe. "443 
Justice Potter Stewart's opinion in Montana also flies in the face of 
437. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981). 
438. ld. at 547. 
439. I d. at 565. 
440. I d. at 565-66 (citations omitted). 
441. ld. at 566. 
442. ld. 
443. ld. 
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the values of federalism. Justice Stewart, for example, noted, 
Any argument that [the Crow Nation hunting and fishing regulation] is 
necessary to Crow tribal self-government is refuted by the findings of 
the District Court that the State of Montana has traditionally exercised 
"near exclusive" jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on fee lands 
within the reservation, and that the parties to this case had 
accommodated themselves to the state regulation.444 
Federalism's values recognize that subnational sovereignty provides a 
necessary check against power exercised by another sovereign. Frequently, 
this check is beneficial as a regulatory backstop when citizens are unable to 
influence policy within another layer of government.445 Rather than accept 
the futility of their political influence given their minority status, citizens 
within regional subunits of the nation can influence policy at a more local 
level within the federal system. In Montana, the citizens of the Crow 
Nation sought to do just that.446 Yet the Supreme Court neglected to 
acknowledge the Crow Nation's lack of influence within state politics and 
its profound interest in crafting hunting and fishing regulations on its own 
reservation. 
Since 1981, the Supreme Court has applied the Montana test in a 
number of circumstances, and in each case it has struck· down tribal civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers. In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Court 
extended the Montana test to a case involving the assertion of tribal 
adjudicatory jurisdiction to hear a personal injury action involving 
nonmember defendants involved in a car accident on a state right-of-way 
across a reservation.447 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg announced that "[a ]s to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe's 
adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction."448 The 
Court concluded that the facts of the case did not fall under either of 
Montana's two exceptions.449 In finding that the second exception did not 
apply, Ginsburg noted that the exception's reference to conduct that 
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe" must be interpreted 
444. Id. at 564 n.13. 
445. See RYAN, supra note 33, at 42. 
446. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 548-49. 
447. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997). 
448. !d. at 453. 
449. !d. at 459. 
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narrowly.450 Otherwise, she noted that "the exception would severely 
shrink the rule."451 In light of this principle, Ginsburg cautioned that the 
second exception must be interpreted consistently with Montana's 
instruction that a tribe's inherent power does not reach "beyond what is 
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations. "452 
Once again, the Supreme Court demonstrated a willingness to 
sacrifice the effective governance potential of federalism when tribal 
governance is involved. In Strate, Justice Ginsburg ignored the problem-
solving value of redundancies within a federal system. These redundancies 
provide individuals with judicial forums that may be more readily available 
for the vindication of rights than the forums of another layer of 
government.453 In Strate, the tribal court offered a valuable opportunity for 
the resolution of the petitioner's claim because it was closer to the affected 
community, it was more familiar with the usages and customs of the area, 
and it was accessible to the parties. However, Justice Ginsburg concluded 
that tribal court jurisdiction was not "necessary to protect tribal self-
government" because the state courts were available to hear the 
petitioner's claim.454 
In Nevada v. Hicks, state game wardens caused property damage to a 
tribe member's home on tribal land while executing a search warrant to 
investigate an off-reservation crime, and the tribal member sued the state 
game wardens in tribal court.455 To evaluate whether the tribal court had 
jurisdiction over the lawsuit, the Court considered whether the exercise of 
tribal power was "necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations."456 The Court's analysis, however, focused not on the 
450. Id. at 457-58 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
451. !d. at 458. 
452. Id. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
453. See Cover, supra note 11, at 661-62. 
454. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564). 
455. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 356 (2001). The tribal member originally 
sued the State of Nevada and the state game wardens in both their official and 
individual capacities, but he voluntarily dismissed the state and official-capacity claims 
against them, leaving only the claims against the wardens in their individual capacities. 
/d. at 357. 
456. /d. at 359 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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need for the tribe to protect its citizens from unlawful searches and 
seizures, but on the interest of the state in executing a search warrant for 
an off-reservation crime.457 The Court devoted several pages to explaining 
the nature of the state's interest in the case, as though a high state interest 
was incompatible with tribal jurisdiction over the case.458 It ultimately 
concluded that the tribal-court lacked jurisdiction because "[t]he State's 
interest in execution of process is considerable, and even when it relates to 
Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the tribe's self-government than federal 
enforcement of federal law impairs state government. "459 
In the more recent decision of Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family 
Land & Cattle Co., the Supreme Court again denied tribal court 
jurisdiction over a civil lawsuit involving Indian plaintiffs and a non-Indian 
defendant.460 The Longs, an Indian couple residing on the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Indian Reservation, sued a non-Indian bank.461 In this case, the 
Court expanded Montana yet again to support a new general rule that 
tribes lack the power to regulate the sale of non-Indian fee land within a 
reservation.462 The lawsuit alleged a breach of contract claim and a claim 
that the bank had discriminated against them by offering them loan terms 
that were less favorable than terms offered to other non-Indian 
individuals.463 The tribal court held a jury trial, and the jury found that the 
bank was liable on several counts for acting unlawfully.464 Consequently, it 
awarded the Longs a judgment of $750,000.465 In a supplemental opinion, 
the tribal court also awarded the Longs an option to purchase a portion of 
the lands that they had originally occupied and that the bank had 
subsequently sold to other buyers.466 In its review of the bank's challenge of 
tribal court jurisdiction, the Court applied Montana, but it noted that, with 
the exception of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima 












/d. at 363-64. 
See id. at 361-64. 
/d. at 364. 
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 
/d. at 320. 
/d. at 335-36. 
/d. at 322. 
!d. at 322-23. 
Id. at 323. 
!d. 
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activities on Indian land.467 Furthermore, the Supreme Court distinguished 
Brendale as a decision that allowed tribal regulation of the uses of non-
Indian fee land within the closed portion of the reservation, while the tribal 
court in the Long case had attempted to regulate the sale of land.468 The 
Court also characterized the tribe as having no interest in regulating the 
sale of non-Indian fee land, because 
[a ]ny direct harm to its political integrity that the tribe sustains as a 
result of fee land sale is sustained at the point the land passes from 
Indian to non-Indian hands .... Once the land has been sold in fee 
simple to non-Indians and passed beyond the tribe's immediate 
control, the mere resale of that land works no additional intrusion on 
tribal relations or self-government. Resale, by itself, causes no 
additional damage.469 
The opinion, then, constitutes a new general presumption that the sale of 
on-reservation, non-Indian fee land can never satisfy Montana's second 
exception. 
The Long case represents yet another example of the Supreme Court 
contradicting basic values of federalism in the tribal context. Once again, 
the Court emphasized that tribal cultural differences constitute a sound 
basis for questioning the legitimacy of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers 
who do business with tribal citizens.470 The Court cautioned that the 
discrimination claim "arose 'directly from Lakota tradition as embedded in 
Cheyenne River Sioux tradition and custom,' including the Lakota 'sense 
of justice, fair play, and decency to others."'471 Once again, the praise the 
Supreme Court offers diversity and pluralism in the context of state 
governance is consistently withheld in the context of tribal custom and 
tradition. The Long decision also emphasized its view that the second 
exception to the Montana test constitutes an extremely high threshold that 
will bar tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmembers in most cases.472 
Although the second exception is phrased as coming into play whenever 
nonmember conduct threatens "the political integrity, economic security, 
467. Id. at 333 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima 
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)). 
468. Id. at 333-34. 
469. Id. at 336. 
470. See id. at 335-36. 
471. Id. at 338 (citation omitted). 
472. Id. at 341. 
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or the health or welfare of [a] tribe,"473 the Long Court explained that the 
nonmember conduct must do more than just injure the tribe to trigger 
tribal jurisdiction. Instead, it must "imperil the subsistence"474 of the tribal 
community or "be necessary to avert catastrophic consequences. "475 By 
integrating these requirements into its recitation of Montana's second 
exception, the Court demonstrates its reasoning is completely at odds with 
federalism's view that subnational governance should be empowered to 
promote effective governance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
From a variety of angles, tribal governance embodies the values of 
federalism to an even greater degree than states. Tribal governance permits 
extensive public participation and engagement with the process of 
lawmaking and government administration. The innovations of tribal 
governmental institutions often produce successful outcomes that state and 
local non-Indian governments clamor to replicate. As traditional 
inhabitants of territories with deep physical, cultural, and spiritual 
connections to specific lands and resources,476 tribal citizens possess a 
unique capacity to tailor local solutions to fit local needs.477 Furthermore, 
473. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). 
474. Long, 554 U.S. at 341 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
475. ld. (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
§ 4.02[3][c], at 232 n.220 (2005 ed.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
476. See, e.g., Declaration of Indian Purpose, AM. INDIAN CHI. CONF. 16 
(1961). 
!d. 
[I]n our day, each remaining acre is a promise that we will still be here 
tomorrow. Were we paid a thousand times the market value of our lost 
holdings, still the payment would not suffice. Money never mothered the 
Indian people, as the land has mothered them, nor have any people become 
more closely attached to the land, religiously and traditionally. 
477. Indeed, Native people within the United States have suffered profound 
dispossession, loss, and hardship as a result of the federal imposition of one-size-fits-all 
policies on their communities. The political branches have long recognized this harmful 
dynamic and have supported tribal self-governance as a result. See, e.g., Tribal Self-
Governance Act of 1994 § 402, 25 U.S.C. §§ 458bb (2012); Indian Self-Determination 
and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988 § 102, 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) 
(establishing "a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will permit an 
orderly transition from the Federal domination of programs for, and services to, 
Indians to effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people in the planning, 
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many Native nations are eager to promote economic development, and 
they compete for business through the use of competitive tax, licensing, or 
other regimes to promote growth.478 Finally, tribal governance embodies 
the single most important characteristic of federalism that distinguishes it 
from mere decentralization. That characteristic is the expression of 
authentic cultural, political, and social difference through the act of legally 
protected, autonomous self-governance.479 
In addition, just as state autonomy can promote the welfare of the 
conduct, and administration of those programs and services"); Indian Financing Act of 
1974 § 2, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (calling for tribes to "fully exercise responsibility for the 
utilization and management of their own resources"); Indian Mineral Development 
Act of 1982 § 2(b), 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b) (furthering the policy of self-determination and 
attempting to help tribes maximize the financial return they receive for mineral 
resource development); Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination 
Act of 2005, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3502(a); RICHARD NIXON, PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS 
RELATING TO THE AMERICAN INDIANS-MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, H. Doc. 
No. 91-363, 116 CONG. REC. 23258 (1970) (calling on Congress to repudiate the 
termination policy and support tribes in managing their own affairs). 




50.105 Employment in Lieu of Tax Policy. 
(a) It is the policy of the Tribe to facilitate and enhance job stability, career 
opportunities and use of inherent Tribal powers to create and maintain a 
sound business environment within the Tribe's jurisdiction. Consistent with 
these goals, it is the policy of the Tribe to promote the least restrictive and 
most cost effective business environment within which a business environment 
can be promoted. As part of this policy, the Tribe hereby establishes an 
"employment in lieu of tax" policy for businesses operating pursuant to the 
authority prescribe[ d) in the Tribal Comprehensive Business Codes. 
(b) The policy contained in 50.105(a) is intended to stimulate and promote 
local employment and business opportunities. While it is anticipated that local 
business development will generate the need to improve services, facilities and 
infrastructure to support business and employment opportunities, consistent 
with the policy of employment in lieu of tax, the Tribal Council will conduct 
direct and open discussions with businesses within the Tribe's jurisdiction to 
address community and governmental infrastructure needs and will strive to 
develop alternative methods for addressing infrastructure needs in lieu of 
imposing taxes on businesses. 
479. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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nation as a whole, so can tribal autonomy elevate the broader society's 
welfare. Tribal self-governance is capable of several extraterritorial 
benefits: innovations can spur policy shifts that improve governance in 
other jurisdictions, tribal governance can avoid the costs of crude one-size-
fits-all laws by ensuring that policies are designed with subtle attention to 
context, and tribal lawmaking and implementation can remedy vexing 
problems that other jurisdictions cannot address on their own. 
Yet, despite the ways in which tribal governance is inextricably linked 
to effective governance, the Supreme Court nearly always neglects this 
relationship. Instead, the Court frames tribal governance as dangerously 
divergent, disruptive, and unnecessary. In doing so, the Court paradoxically 
stymies effective governance and creates unnecessary barriers to the 
promotion of federalism's values. 
A better path would acknowledge that Indian tribes are important 
members of the nation's federal system. United States federalism, through 
incorporation of tribes as sovereigns that participate in self-rule with 
shared rule, is an adaptive, complex system in which tribes exist with 
asymmetrical status. Tribal governments are not the equivalent of states, 
but they exhibit the characteristics of federalism, and their exercise of 
jurisdiction should be interpreted as an example of federalism's values in 
operation. 
In light of the connection between tribal governance and federalism's 
values, the judiciary should engage in functional assessments of tribal 
capacity to promote federalism's values when it reviews cases in ambiguous 
areas when tribes assert jurisdiction over nonmembers. This form of 
analysis recognizes that determinations based on competing rights 
frequently fail to offer satisfying resolution of disputes. An analysis based 
on practical reasoning, involving an assessment of tribes' potential to offer 
effective governance, gives tribes respect for their contributions to society 
and promotes the welfare of everyone.480 
480. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the 
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1137, 1216-30 (1990). 
